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  This Article examines the changing balance between public and private rights in disputes involving information in
the digital environment.  Given the impact electronic-mediated information promises to make on society in the
twenty-first century, it is important to identify the values we are promoting when resolving current issues regarding
information as property.  Recent trends in copyright policy have resulted in an increasing privatization of the
information that flows through the vast system of interlinked computer networks popularly described as
"cyberspace."  In this Article I argue that such information is inherently public property and, as such, its
management through copyright policy is subject to the same public trust principles that have operated as a check on
the privatization of other types of public resources.
  I begin my argument by distinguishing between the two interpretive frameworks that determine what are or should
be copyright's primary objectives: copyright rhetoric, which is based upon an incentive rationale that seeks to
promote access, and copyright reality, which is based on a neoclassical economic rationale that seeks to promote
wealth maximization.  I then argue that the tendency of Congress, the courts and, recently, the Clinton
Administration to favor a neoclassical economic rationale for copyright results in an unauthorized transfer of
information policy from the public realm to the private realm.  I assert that this transfer is achieved through circular
baseline fallacies that overwhelmingly favor the privatization of information.
  *648 In the context of a discussion of the unique features of today's information society, I argue that copyright
policy should be developed and interpreted from a baseline of public rights to access rather one that consistently
favors private ownership of information.  I then suggest a public trust paradigm for formulating copyright principles
in a digital world.  I argue that the government is required to begin from a public rights baseline because information
is a public trust resource subject to public trust principles.  In doing so, I trace the development of the public trust
doctrine from its origins as a doctrine that circumscribes the government's management of waterways and subjective
lands to a doctrine that has expanded to include a number of additional types of inherently public property as public
trust resources.
  In identifying the criteria that qualify a particular resource as a public trust resource, I assert that recognized public
trust resources tend to share two qualities: (1) their management tends to be subject to defective political and
administrative processes due to the diffuse nature of the resource, and (2) they are resources that are constitutive of
community and, thus, better managed from the baseline of a public commons.  Finally, I argue that information,
especially given the new digital environment, meets both of these criteria, and thus should be treated in law as a
public trust resource.  As such, its management through copyright policy is subject to public trust principles, which
would require a significantly stronger public focus than copyright policy currently exhibits.  Thus, it would provide
the substance needed to reinvigorate copyright rhetoric and reestablish a proper balance between public and private
interests in the copyright arena.
I The Justification for Copyright: Rhetoric Versus Reality
  Professor Joseph Sax, the intellectual founder of modern public trust theory, observed recently that "the dominant
modern idea of ownership is understood as entitlement to possess an object as an exclusively private thing, devoid of
any public element." [FN1]  Sax singles out copyright as an exception, however, stating that "the law is
parsimonious in granting property rights.  Even those who have thought up an idea, or discovered a fact, *649
frequently get no right of property in that accomplishment-despite their efforts-because the law so greatly values
open access to the basic building blocks of human achievement." [FN2]  It appears that Professor Sax has joined the
ranks of those bamboozled by the empty rhetoric that permeates copyright policy and jurisprudence.
  Pursuant to current copyright policy, works of authorship are essentially treated as items of individual property
under United States copyright law. [FN3]  And while the copyright system is ultimately viewed as a means to
further, and thus should be defined by, the public good, [FN4] copyright's rhetoric and copyright's reality diverge
widely in defining just exactly what type of "public good" copyright doctrine seeks to achieve.  The rhetoric
premises copyright policy on the notion that ultimate rights in creative works should be jealously reserved to the
public, subject only to limited rights necessary to provide an incentive to create.  Such a system preserves the
"public good" by promoting public access to creative works.  The reality discloses a system of private property
rights that serves the  "public good" by channeling existing creative works to their "highest and best use" and by
signaling the desired types of future works.  In this context, public interest is equated with the maximization of
society's total "wealth," [FN5] without consideration of distributional effects.
A. Copyright Rhetoric: An Incentive Justification
  Copyright rhetoric justifies applying property principles to creative expression through an incentive rationale that
theoretically finds its foundation in the Constitution. [FN6]  Article I of the United *650 States Constitution gives
Congress the exclusive power to "promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to
Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries." [FN7]  The copyright
policy envisioned in the Constitution is rooted in democratic values.  The framers who enacted the Copyright Clause
thought it essential to the establishment of a democratic government that society be provided with new ideas and
knowledge. [FN8]  They viewed scientific inquiry--the search for truth without prejudice--as the prime means by
which new ideas are generated. [FN9]
  Pursuant to its Constitutional mandate, Congress enacted the Copyright Act, [FN10] which entitles authors to
property rights in certain creative works. [FN11]  According to copyright rhetoric, these property rights are not a
matter of divine right. [FN12]  Rather, property interests in creative expression have a limited functional role in
society.  Copyright rhetoric asserts that the purpose of copyright is to advance learning and knowledge by
stimulating creativity that results in the widest possible production and dissemination of creative works, [FN13]
without emphasis on the "value" of those works. [FN14]  This rhetoric views reward to authors *651 as secondary to
these principles. [FN15]  From this rhetoric emerges the theme that copyright justification "rests solely on a
utilitarian foundation." [FN16]  According to this theme, copyright doctrine is animated by the notion that
copyright's support for the creation and dissemination of knowledge for the benefit of the public [FN17] is the
regime's paramount utilitarian purpose. [FN18]
  Pursuant to incentive theory, copyright uses the economic rewards of the market to stimulate the production and
dissemination of new works. [FN19] Incentive theory assumes that creative expression will likely be both under
produced and under disseminated if authors are not afforded some copyright protection in their expression to ensure
a financial return on the costs of creating and disseminating their original works. [FN20]  This assumption *652
rests entirely on the theory that authors will not create works and make them available to the public unless they can
prevent "free riders" [FN21] from copying those works and siphoning some of the value of the copied work by
selling the copies to the public at a lower cost. [FN22] Faced with such competition, the original author cannot sell
copies of her work at a price that would enable her to recover the costs of creating the original work. [FN23]  If she
cannot recover the costs of her original work, the author may forego authorship in favor of some other line of work,
thus depriving society of additional creative works. [FN24]  As a result, only those authors who desire to create
independent of financial return will continue to produce creative works. [FN25]
  To counteract this problem, the Copyright Act grants authors certain exclusive rights with regard to their works.
[FN26]  This copyright*653 protection increases the cost of, and thus decreases the incentive for, copying by
allowing an author to legally prohibit a competitor from copying an original work. [FN27]  Because an author can
prevent free riders from copying and distributing an author's work without paying copyright royalties, [FN28]
copyright protection creates an artificial scarcity [FN29] in the means of accessing a creative work, and gives the
copyright owner a monopoly [FN30] in the resulting market for such access.  This monopoly right enables copyright
owners to charge substantially more than the costs of creation for access to such creative works. [FN31]  Thus, by
giving authors an enforceable property right in their works, copyright provides authors an economic incentive to
produce creative works.
  *654 While some copyright protection may be necessary to prevent an underproduction of creative works, the
monopoly property right attendant to that protection carries serious social costs.  For copyright to serve its goal of
promoting learning and knowledge, the copyright induced works must be accessible to the public.  Copyright
protection decreases access to existing copyrighted works, however, by enabling an author to charge a higher price
for such access. [FN32]
  Thus, the artificial scarcity created by copyright ultimately can lead to a deadweight social loss [FN33] stemming
from a copyright holder's monopoly on access to existing works. [FN34]  Those seeking access will have to pay
more for the work than they would have had to pay in a naturally competitive market.  Those members of the public
who may have been willing to purchase access to the work at a competitive cost may be unwilling or unable to
purchase access to the creative work at its monopolistic price. [FN35]  Those users who do purchase the work at its
higher, monopolistic price must transfer "monies that would otherwise have remained in their collective pocket as
consumer surplus [FN36] to the author in *655 the form of a monopoly profit or rent." [FN37]  At some point,
copyright protection reduces the supply of new works because the number of authors deterred by the high cost of
accessing source material exceeds the number encouraged to create by the economic incentives stemming from
copyright protection. [FN38]  Ultimately, copyright's monopoly protection can strangle the creative process. [FN39]
  Recognizing the social costs of copyright, an incentive justification for copyright requires that authors be protected
no more than necessary to induce the creation of new works. [FN40]  Thus, under the incentive theory, the tension in
copyright law lies in determining when "exclusive rights should end and unrestrained public access should begin."
[FN41]  Copyright's proper scope pursuant to incentive rhetoric is a matter of "balancing the benefits of broader
protection, in the form of increased incentive to produce such works, against its costs, in the form of lost access to
such works." [FN42] Copyright protection must be broad enough to provide *656 authors adequate incentives to
produce and disseminate creative works, but not so broad that an author's ability to extract monopoly rents for
access chills the production and dissemination of, and access to, creative works. [FN43]
B. Copyright Reality: A Neoclassical Economic Justification
  Recently, neoclassical economic theory, as opposed to incentive theory, has emerged as the principal theoretical
justification for awarding expansive copyright protection for creative works.  Neoclassical economic theory does not
dispute that copyright provides an incentive for authors to create and disseminate works.  Neoclassical economic
analysis provides a conceptually distinct approach to copyright from incentive rationale, however. According to this
theory, "[t]he basic purpose of a property system, from an economic perspective, is to ensure that resources are
allocated to their highest valued use." [FN44]  Because broad copyright protection enables the development of a
market for existing creative works, it serves as a vehicle for directing investment in, and thus signaling the value of,
such works.  From the perspective of economic theory, copyright provides the appropriate degree of protection for a
creative work when the market can channel that creative work to its most "highly valued use." [FN45]  Thus, while
incentive rationale for copyright focuses on the precarious balance between access and incentive, the neoclassical
economic approach strives to create and perfect "markets for all potential uses of creative works for which there may
be willing buyers." [FN46]
  When viewed through this lens, copyright has vastly different *657 objectives.  Total wealth maximization requires
that all commodities are channeled to their most valued use.  Creative works are commodities whose value is best
determined by the market. [FN47]  As with other commodities, the price prospective users are willing to pay for the
use of a creative work reflects the value such users attach to that commodity. [FN48] Collectively, consumer
demand defines the social value of a work. [FN49] Ultimately, the social utility and value of these works is
measured by the price they can command in the market. [FN50]  The goal of copyright pursuant to a neoclassical
economic justification is to allocate creative works according to this market assigned value.  Pursuant to this theory,
consumer demand will not only signal the value of existing works, but also signal the types of future works society
should invest its resources in.  Thus, members of the consumer public cast their "economic votes" to determine the
type of works that should be produced and distributed.
  Neoclassical economic theory views a system of clearly defined property rights as a prerequisite for such market
efficiency because the economic model through which the allocative goals of copyright doctrine are theoretically
realized requires broad, fully exchangeable property rights. [FN51]  Under a neoclassical economic justification for
copyright, therefore, authors of creative expression must be afforded broad proprietary rights that extend to every
conceivable valuable use. [FN52]  Thus, while "the incentive approach tends to look critically at copyright's
expansion, questioning whether greater protection is necessary to provide an *658 economic incentive for the
production of creative works," the neoclassic economic approach "has pushed economic analysis in the opposite
direction.  It supports expanded intellectual property rights and a diminished public domain." [FN53]
II Copyright Reality in a Digital World
  The rapid creation and expansion of the digital environment in general, and the Internet in particular, have
presented new challenges to traditional legal conceptions of copyright [FN54] as well as existing copyright law.
[FN55]  New digital information technology has increasingly exacerbated the debates revolving around the theories
that drive copyright policy.
  The current architecture of the Internet, which provides access to so many different types of information, has
resulted in the elimination of physical constraints on copying and distribution. [FN56]  The digital format allows
perfect copies to be made instantaneously.  Moreover, the Internet allows these copies to be widely distributed in a
short period of time.  Because these capabilities have substantially diminished the physical limitations of
dissemination technology, copyrighted works are much more readily accessible to the public.
  Copyright has recently been perceived by strong protectionists as unstable because of the rapid advances in
computer technology for creating, reproducing, and communicating authors' works. [FN57]  The same capabilities
that enhance access to creative works are viewed by strong protectionists as greatly undermining copyright owners'
ability to enforce copyright rights. These protectionists argue that technology has lead to "widespread 'information
piracy' in cyberspace." [FN58]
  As a result, Congress and the courts have been asked to consider *659 the extent to which traditional limitations
and exceptions to copyright holder rights should carry over into the digital environment. [FN59]  Additionally,
commentators are debating the question. [FN60]  Consequently, issues such as whether a copyright's duration should
be further extended and whether fair use is necessary in the digital environment have found their way onto the
administrative and legislative agendas.
  To deal with these and other important and challenging issues, we need a thoughtful copyright philosophy against
which to assess the merits of various administrative, judicial, and legislative trends concerning copyright doctrine.
Unfortunately all such trends point to a reckless reliance on a neoclassical economic view of copyright.  As a result,
the intellectual focus of the political debate surrounding access to information has changed sharply from public
entitlement to private initiatives.  Consequently, the principle that copyright is a private property right, entitling
authors to control and be paid for any exploitation of their works, is taking on new dimensions in cyberspace.
Conversely, this new venue for information exchange is increasingly bereft of public protections against the whims
of private ownership.
A. Traditional Limiting Doctrines
  Tailoring an incentive system of copyright protection in cyberspace to the minimum necessary for inducing
creative activity would impose onerous administrative costs.  Therefore, the *660 courts and Congress have created
traditional limiting doctrines that, when taken at face value, seek to address the access problems that copyright
monopoly creates.  As a result, copyright is "punctuated with limitations and exceptions" [FN61] seen to create
rights to information that "belong to the community as a whole." [FN62]
  These doctrines theoretically preserve public access rights to copyrighted works by, for example, limiting the
duration of the copyright, limiting an author's control over a copy of a copyrighted work after its first sale, and by
limiting the right of an author to prevent certain "fair" uses of a copyrighted work. [FN63]  Additionally, the scope
of the copyright is limited to the author's manner of expression.  Copyright protection does not extend to the ideas,
processes, systems, principles, or discoveries that may be contained in a work of authorship. [FN64]  Thus, when
viewed through the perspective of the incentive rationale, a copyright owner's rights over creative works is
inherently burdened by a number of "communitarian limitations." [FN65] These exceptions and limitations that have
traditionally reserved broad access rights to the public have been viewed as "especially warranted in the area of
open-access digital communication." [FN66]
B. Limiting the Limitations in Cyberspace
  Copyright's exceptions and limitations detract from a copyright owner's full property rights.  Accordingly, pursuant
to neoclassical economic theory, these limitations should be meagerly applied because such limitations interfere
with the ability of market mechanisms to allocate resources through pricing information. [FN67]  Pursuant to a
neoclassical economic justification, therefore, the courts and Congress must employ limitations sparingly *661 to
avoid disrupting the pricing mechanism of the market through which customers signal what works are socially
valuable. [FN68]
  Recent trends in copyright's traditional access-based limitations illustrate just such a neoclassical economic shift in
the copyright template.  A close examination of these trends, which are largely driven by new technology that has
created a digital environment, discloses copyright's reality that has its basis in a broad, rather than limited, property
right.  Copyright policy makers have been increasingly receptive to copyright owners' claims to control all or nearly
all uses of their works. [FN69]  As a result, the neoclassical economic theory shaping current doctrine has
consistently and drastically cut back on limitations in copyrights, while at the same time expanding an author's
proprietary rights to creative works. [FN70]  Increasingly, the courts and Congress view all uncompensated uses of
copyrighted works as intolerable "invasions of the rights in the copyright bundle." [FN71]
  Advances in computer technology promise to change, probably enlarge, the markets for creative works. [FN72]
Thus, efforts to adapt copyright features to the digital environment have consistently promoted the goal of enabling
copyright owners to capture a greater share of the increased value embodied in protected works.  This view is
strongly reflected in recent administrative musings as well as recent copyrights laws enacted to prepare copyright for
the digital environment.  Despite a broad rhetorical recognition of a societal claim to access to information, the
application of copyright doctrine to the digital environment is unmistakably focused on the privatization of
electronic-mediated information.
*662 1. The White Paper
  In response to innovations in digital-information technology, the Clinton Administration began to examine the
issue of property rights in the digital environment in the early 1990's.  Ultimately, the Administration issued a policy
statement called the "White Paper," containing an analysis of copyright issues affecting, and affected by, the
"Information Infrastructure."  The report outlined policies underlying proposed legislation to adapt copyright to the
digital environment, discussed ways that copyright laws might be modified to be more conducive to the
development of new communications technologies, and offered suggestions for copyright revision. [FN73]
  Ironically, this proposal included the very incentive rhetoric that frequently serves to cloak copyright's reality.
[FN74]  The White Paper suggested that, in the face of technological advances, legislators should analyze copyright
law to assure that it continues to maintain a balance between public access to works and the economic incentives for
authors to create. [FN75]  With such rhetoric, however, the White Paper masked an unmistakable neoclassical
economic view of copyright.
  The report actually represented an effort to expand the scope of intellectual property rights beyond any incentive
justification. [FN76]  Instead of making a sensitive assessment of the complexities involved in the incentive aspects
of network economics, the White Paper assumed an extension of existing copyright law principles *663 into
cyberspace and called for some new ones as well.[FN77]  Although the report asserted that such an extension would
require only relatively minor adjustments to current copyright law, [FN78] others have argued that the White Paper's
proposed adjustments were in reality major extensions of copyright law, limiting earlier patterns of free use and
requiring major intrusions into existing cyberspace. [FN79]
  One of the White Paper's most controversial proposals focused on digital transmissions [FN80] unique to the
digital environment and on the potential reproduction rights attendant to these transmissions. [FN81]  The report
took the contentious position that current law gives the copyright owner control over virtually any reproduction,
including the temporary, incidental storage of Internet communications in the ordinary course of network operations.
[FN82]  The report based this view on the notion that such a transmission falls within a copyright owner's exclusive
right to produce a reproduction as a derivative work. [FN83]
  *664 The Internet transmits digital units that eventually emerge as an image on a computer monitor or as audio on
a computer sound system. [FN84] These digital units are temporarily and automatically stored on a series of network
computers as they make their way to the end-user. [FN85]  The White Paper took the position that copies of a work
are made not only when the online user stores a work to a hard or floppy disk, or prints it out, but also when a
temporary copy is received in the memory of a computer or appears on an end- user's monitor. [FN86]  Thus,
according to the White Paper, simple browsing would or should constitute copyright infringement by Internet users.
[FN87] Browsing is the act of viewing on a computer screen materials accessed from other computers connected to
the Internet. [FN88]  Because browsing involves the making of a temporary copy of the accessed materials in the
memory of *665 the user's computer, the White Paper argued that such temporary copies are reproductions that may
infringe copyright. [FN89]
  Although a couple of federal courts have characterized this placement of a computer image as a "reproduction"
under the Copyright Act, [FN90] the White Paper took an expansive reading of precedent in asserting that copyright
law already grants broad transmission rights. [FN91]  While limited rights to control transmission exist in the
Copyright Act, no general right to control transmission of copyrighted material now exists. [FN92]
  Anticipating such a challenge, the Administration hoped that legislators might be persuaded to extend the present
right of reproduction to encompass the electronic transmission of works as a natural extension of the traditional right
of reproduction, [FN93] and thereby solidify the White Paper's position on transmission rights.  Thus, the White
Paper asked Congress to consider amending the Copyright Act to specifically provide for broad claims of ownership
to transmission as opposed to just production of copies. [FN94]
  Such an exclusive right to digital transmissions would greatly extend copyright's reach in the digital environment.
The proposed doctrine creates the prospect of being able to charge for every conceivable digital use of copyrighted
works. [FN95]  Thus, it *666 "would enhance the exclusive rights in the copyright bundle so far as to give the
copyright owner the exclusive right to control reading, viewing or listening to any work in digitized form." [FN96]
Digital transmissions are essential to "reading, viewing, listening to, learning from, sharing, improving, and reusing
works embodied in digital media." [FN97]  Under the Administration's view, a user could not access any
information in a computer-mediated environment without making an infringing "reproduction" of that information.
[FN98]  As Jessica Litman has noted, "the suggested application of copyright law to digital media potentially
affects, indeed prohibits, most common everyday ways one can use a computer or other digital device to read, view,
hear or otherwise experience copyrighted works." [FN99]  Each Internet communication, every e-mail, becomes a
potential copyright infringement. [FN100]  Add the acts of uploading [FN101] and downloading [FN102] and the
typical user of digital technology becomes a serial copyright infringer.
  The White Paper proposal clearly sought to expand copyright protection beyond that provided to works fixed in a
non-digital format.  Outside of the digital environment, one may purchase a copy of a copyrighted work, and then
give, sell, or loan it to someone else without incurring infringement liability pursuant to copyright's "First Sale"
doctrine. [FN103]  Such noninfringing transfers greatly increase public access to information.  Pursuant to the White
Paper proposal, however, if a user received a document from an Internet site, downloaded it, and then passed it on
electronically to another person, he would be liable for copyright infringement.
  *667 "Increasingly, works of all sorts are being created and disseminated in digital form.  If reading or viewing
these works violates the reproduction right, then we need to be concerned about preserving the free access to ideas
and other unprotected material that lies at the heart of our copyright system." [FN104]  Characterizing such
unavoidable transmissions as infringing reproductions would seriously compromise the access benefits of
cyberspace.  "Once we insist . . . that the reproduction right extends not only to replication but to consumption, there
is no way to guard the expression from copying while ensuring access to the ideas it expresses." [FN105]
2. Rights-Management Containers and The Digital Millennium Copyright Act
  After the Clinton Administration introduced the White Paper in both the House and the Senate, the legislative
proposals eventually stalled due to resistance from a variety of groups. [FN106]  The Administration then
transferred its efforts to the international arena. [FN107]  As discussed below, the Administration was moderately
successful in promoting electronic copyright protection that will technologically prevent unauthorized access to
works rather than merely prohibit it.  The recent advent of computer "fencing" technology, coupled with the
Administration's international legislation efforts, have greatly strengthened the ability of content providers to legally
and technologically protect online information and, at the same time, reduce public access to that information.
a. Rights-Management Containers
  Equating digital transmission with actionable reproduction may become merely an academic issue because of the
advent of extra-legal, technological efforts to protect intellectual property in cyberspace.  These efforts have
produced technological fences *668 known as rights-management containers.  This container-based technology
provides direct control of access to online information.  These "fences" include technological measures such as
scrambling and encrypting copyrighted works, as well as other measures designed effectively to restrict access to
users holding a specific "key" given only with the copyright owner's authority. [FN108]  Digital information can
only be accessed through the container because, once the content is encrypted, it cannot be read outside the
container.  Only the container has the key to decrypt it. [FN109]
  The container also manages transactions between the user and the content provider by implementing stored
instructions that precisely detail "which uses to permit, which uses to deny, and how much to charge for each."
[FN110] "Because these instructions are embedded in the container and must be passed through every time the
content is accessed, they enable the content provider to maintain complete control over every interaction between
user and content." [FN111]
  By affording copyright owners absolute control over online content, rights-management containers may
significantly diminish public access to information by circumventing the limitations intended to guarantee such
access under copyright law. [FN112]  These systems promise to restrict the public domain by, for example, evading
copyright's duration limitation, nullifying the first sale doctrine, circumventing the fair use doctrine, [FN113] and
foreclosing access to the ideas and facts imbedded in protected expression.
  Pursuant to the Constitution and the Copyright Act, a copyright owner holds rights to creative works only for a
limited term.  At the end of that term, the creative works becomes freely accessible as part of the public domain.
Technologically protected works effectively may be withheld from the public domain interminably, however.
[FN114]  As a result, "digital information that is provided only within containers-as might eventually be the case for
music, video, and software-might never be released from technological*669 protection." [FN115]  Thus, the access
previously provided through limiting terms of copyright protection could be seriously curtailed through unlimited
technological protection.
  The Copyright Act furthers public access by limiting a copyright owner's control over copies of their creative
works beyond the first sale.  The first sale doctrine has historically permitted the purchaser of a copy of a
copyrighted work to sell, loan, lease, or display the copy without the copyright owner's permission.  Purchasers of a
copy can freely transfer that copy through gift, loan, or sale after the initial purchase without infringing on the
copyright holders rights. [FN116]  Hence, libraries, video rental stores, art galleries, and other similar entities are
able to facilitate public access to many different types of works.  Rights-management technology, combined with the
proposal to equate digital transmissions with infringing reproductions, effectively eliminates the first sale doctrine in
the digital environment by indefinitely extending control over access to a work beyond the initial distribution.
[FN117]  Purchasers of a digital work can no longer facilitate public access to a work through subsequent transfer
because the container technologically prevents such a transfer.
  The Copyright Act reserves to the public a right of fair use of creative works in situations where copyright
restrictions undermine the very exposure to information copyright is designed to promote. [FN118]  Because rights-
management technology controls access to online information, however, otherwise fair uses can be technologically
prevented. [FN119]  Any user who seeks to access information will have to pay an access fee for each use of
technologically protected information, regardless of the purpose of the use. [FN120]  Such containers can therefore
circumvent the Copyright Act's requirement that fair uses be permitted.
  Finally, the Copyright Act [FN121] and the Constitution [FN122] deem the facts and ideas imbedded in
copyrighted works to be unprotectable and, therefore, part of the public domain.  "Recently, the *670 basic principle
that copyright protects neither ideas nor information has eroded, as copyright owners have found strategies to
prevent the disclosure and dissemination of ideas and information that have become valuable commodities in the
contemporary marketplace." [FN123]  One of these strategies is the rights-management container, which allows a
provider to prevent free access to the unprotected aspects of expression. [FN124]  Contrary to the spirit of asserted
copyright philosophy, such "unprotectable" attributes of creative works are left entirely to the dominion of the
owner, with no duty to make them accessible to the public.
  Technological "fences" promise to conflict with a user's legitimate interests under the copyright statute.  Thus, "the
adoption of rights-management containers to protect intellectual property represents a shift in the nature of
intellectual property rights, granting copyright owners far greater control over their works than they would otherwise
enjoy under existing copyright law." [FN125]
b. The Digital Millennium Copyright Act
  Rights-management containers promise to extra-legally strengthen the content provider's ability to control online
information. [FN126]  As a result, such technology can be used to lock up information that should be freely
accessible for public benefit pursuant to copyright law. [FN127]  Consequently, some commentators have argued
that the public should enjoy a "right to hack" into rights-management systems to access this information. [FN128]
Instead, *671 Congress has recently supplemented this technological protection with legal protection that prohibits
circumvention of the container.
  In 1998, Congress enacted the Digital Millennium Copyright Act [FN129]  (DMCA), which augments rights-
management technologies by prohibiting their circumvention. [FN130]  The DMCA resulted from the Clinton
Administration's recast of copyright as an international concern. [FN131]  Having failed to obtain Congressional
enactment of the White Paper's proposed legislationto expand the copyright rights of digital content providers, the
Clinton Administration reintroduced key elements of the failed legislation as treaty proposals at the December 1996
World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) [FN132] conference in Geneva. [FN133]  At this conference,
intellectual property became the focus of considerable international lawmaking efforts to create universal minimum
standards of intellectual property protection. [FN134]
  The Administration's strategy consisted of returning to Congress *672 with its White Paper proposals embodied in
"a signed treaty as a near fait accompli." [FN135]  In large part, this strategy paid off.  As a result, the most
important legislative developments regarding copyright and the Internet came from WIPO implementation
legislation enforcing two treaties concluded at the December, 1996, conference: the World Intellectual Property
Organization (WIPO) Copyright Treaty and the WIPO Performances and Phonograms Treaty.  These WIPO treaties,
which reiterate key elements of the expansive intellectual property agenda initially set forth in the White Paper,
[FN136] set the tone for "domestic legislation designed to bring copyright law into the digital age." [FN137]
  Most of the DMCA concerns copyright protection in the digital environment.  The design of Title I of the DMCA,
which implements the WIPO Copyright Treaty and WIPO Performances and Phonograms Treaty, [FN138] is to give
copyright owners broad control over access to and use of the works they control, subject to extraordinarily specific
narrow exceptions.  The purpose of the legislation, like the purpose of the treaty, is to encourage private,
technological protections of copyrighted material. [FN139]
  The DMCA not only makes it illegal to circumvent the technological measures that control access to copyrighted
works, but also prohibits anyone from providing the means or the service to do so. [FN140]  For example, a
publisher of material available only on the Internet may control access to it by giving a password only to
subscribers.  Someone who circumvents the password or who sells software intentionally designed to circumvent the
password *673 so that the work can be accessed would be liable under the DMCA.  Thus, the DMCA extends
copyright protection far beyond the right of reproduction to a right to directly restrict access.
  Prohibiting circumvention to obtain unauthorized access adds a bold new right to the copyright holders' bundle.
The Copyright Act does not expressly provide, and it generally has not been interpreted to imply, that a copyright
owner has the right to control all access to creative works.  While the DMCA does not expressly recognize a new
right to control access, it effectively does so.  Affording such "control over reproduction could potentially allow
copyright owners control over every use of digital technology in connection with their protected works." [FN141]
3. The Copyright Term Extension Act
  Although traditional property ordinarily can be owned forever, copyright must be of limited duration. [FN142]
After the copyright period has expired, the work falls into the public domain, where it may be freely used by anyone.
[FN143]  Until very recently, the duration of copyright protection lasted no longer than the life of the author plus
fifty years.  Before the 1976 Copyright Act, copyright duration was significantly shorter: a 14-year term that was
renewable for one additional 14-year term.  The 1976 Act's extended duration was "formulated in deference to the
needs of the author, omitting any calculus of public benefit." [FN144]  Recently, Congress again dismissed public
access needs by further extending the term.  Congress argued that such an extension was necessary to allow
copyright owners to fully exploit extended markets created by the digital environment.
  On October 27, 1998, President Clinton signed into law the "Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act," which
extends the copyright term by 20 years. [FN145]  The Act provides that the standard term of protection for works
created on or after January 1, 1978, is now the life of the author, plus 70 years.  Additionally, *674 the term of
protection for works made for hire is now 95 years from publication or 120 years from creation, whichever is earlier.
[FN146]  Works created but not published before January 1, 1978, will now remain protected until December 31,
2027, but if such a work has been published by that date, it will remain protected until December 31, 2047. [FN147]
  Orrin Hatch introduced the copyright extension legislation. [FN148]  Hatch's introduction of this bill was
"motivated by a number of factors, all of which tie into the philosophy of a default policy protecting strong
copyright protection to the extent that is does not impede creativity or the wide dissemination of works." [FN149]
Hatch explained that the advent of digital media and the development of the Global Information Infrastructure "have
dramatically enhanced the marketable lives of creative works." [FN150] According to Hatch, an extension was
necessary to compensate for "the failure of the U.S. copyright term to keep pace with the substantially increased
commercial lives of copyrighted works resulting from the rapid growth in communications media." [FN151]  In his
view, "the basic functions of copyright protection are best served by a policy that rewards authors with the benefits
of these newly enhanced opportunities for commercial exploitation of their works." [FN152]  As a result of this
extension, the flow of copyrighted material into the public domain is substantially deferred.
4. Recent Trends in Fair Use Jurisprudence
  The fair use doctrine purportedly serves as a mechanism for striking a balance between copyright's costs and
benefits. [FN153]  The doctrine permits otherwise infringing uses of copyrighted works without the permission of
the copyright holder. [FN154]  Copyright *675 rhetoric asserts that the fair use doctrine reflects a theoretical desire
among Congress and the courts to limit copyright protection in situations where such protection will not generate
incentives sufficient to warrant the social costs associated with monopoly power (or, in fact, might be
counterproductive to such incentives). [FN155]  Thus, at first glance, this limitation on copyright protection appears
to be consistent with an incentive justification for copyright.  This notion is bolstered by the fact that the 1976 Act
describes fair use as a reservation in the rights granted the author. [FN156]
  As a result of recent assaults on copyright's other limiting doctrines, users of copyrighted material are
moredependent on the fair use doctrine for access.  Unfortunately, however, fair use applications are shrinking along
with other traditional  limitations.  While the incentive theme pervades the superficial rhetoric of the courts' fair use
decisions, it does not appear to animate the courts' fair use jurisprudence.
  A brief review of recent fair use cases illustrates that the courts, despite their rhetorical flourishes, appear to have
thoroughly embraced copyright's expansion into a broad neoclassical economic property right. [FN157]  As a result,
the courts have converted *676 fair use from a standard that allowed for considerable access to works as part of the
process of creating a new work to a standard that permits such a use only in anomalistic cases. [FN158]
  The United States Supreme Court inaugurated the judicial embrace of a neoclassical economic justification for
copyright through a small number of fair use cases interpreting Congress's 1976 codification of the fair use doctrine.
[FN159]  The Court inadvertently ventured into an economic analysis of fair use in its first case interpreting the
1976 fair use codification. [FN160]  In Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc., [FN161] the Court
employed the economic justification of fair use analysis to justify a finding that private, noncommercial home
videotaping was fair use.  The Sony Court stated that "every commercial use of copyrighted material is
presumptively . . . unfair." [FN162]  The Court then determined that the home videotaping at issue was a fair use
because it was noncommercial and thus yielded social benefits while presenting no commercial detriment to the
copyright holders.  The Court reasoned that "a use that has no demonstrable effect upon the potential market for, or
the value of, the copyrighted work need not be prohibited in order to protect the author's incentive to create."
[FN163]  In determining that all commercial uses are presumptively unfair and by focusing on a use's harm to all
potential markets, the Court laid the groundwork for a subsequent fair use interpretation that has severely limited a
traditionally expansive *677 doctrine. [FN164]
  In Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enterprises, [FN165] the case in which the Court most clearly
revealed its incorporation of market theory into the fair use arena, the Court further limited the fair use doctrine
along neoclassical economic lines.  In Harper & Row, editors of The Nation magazine excerpted and published key
portions of the unpublished manuscript of Gerald Ford's autobiography relating to the Nixon pardon.  Time
magazine, which had secured the exclusive right to print prepublication excerpts from the manuscript, then refused
to pay for such rights.
  In the absence of a clear mandate in existing case law as to how to apply the statutory fair use factors, the Harper &
Row Court turned to the writings of Professor Wendy Gordon, a leading theorist for the neoclassical economic view
of copyright.  In an early article, Professor Gordon had advocated that fair use be restricted to cases where the
defendant proves that market failure is insurmountable, that transferring control over the use would serve the public
interest, and that the copyright owner's incentives would not be substantially impaired. [FN166]  Thus, according to
Professor Gordon, the narrow role of fair use is to correct market failure or protect socially desirable uses that do not
impact the value of the copyright.
  In Harper & Row, the Court relied heavily on Professor Gordon's application of neoclassical economic analysis to
fair use questions.  After invoking the obligatory incentive rhetoric, [FN167] *678 the Court, without relying on any
precedent, characterized the effect of a challenged use on the market for the original creative work as "undoubtedly
the single most important element of fair use." [FN168]  Thus, impact on potential licensing revenues immediately
became determinative of fair use questions.  Implementing Gordon's market model of fair use, as well as the
restrictive conditions that flow from that model, the Court held that fair use should be available only in isolated
cases of market failure and in the absence of any adverse effect on the potential market for the copyrighted work not
only from the use in question, but from others like it. [FN169]  Thus, the Court construed copyright to give an
author a property right defined by the prerogative to extract all actual and potential economic value from a creative
work unlimited to that necessary to stimulate production.  This reasoning provided the Court the justification for
stating that The Nation's use of the excerpts was not a fair use.
  The Court next touched on fair use analysis in Stewart v. Abend. [FN170]  In Stewart, the Court held that a
filmmaker's unauthorized use of a short story as a basis for a derivative motion picture was not a fair use because it
impinged on the ability to market new versions of the story. [FN171]  In its brief analysis of the fair use factors, the
Court restated that the effect on the potential market was the most important factor to consider. [FN172]
  In its most recent foray into fair use analysis, Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., [FN173] the Court employed
market failure analysis to uphold a parody as fair use.  In this case, the music group 2 Live Crew released a rap
version of Roy Orbison's 1964 pop hit "Oh, Pretty Woman."  Acuff-Rose, a music publisher holding the copyright to
the song, sued the group for copyright infringement.  The Court held that 2 Live Crew's version of the song, even
though commercial, [FN174] was a parody of the original *679 Orbison composition, and hence was a fair use
because it could not replace the original in the market.  According to the Court, the market for potential derivative
uses includes only those uses that creators of original works would in general develop or license others to develop.
[FN175]  For example, criticism would not constitute a cognizable derivative market because few, if any, copyright
owners will license reviews critical of their works. [FN176]  Similarly, a copyright holder is unlikely to authorize a
secondary user to parodize an original work.  Thus, parodies such as 2 Live Crew's constitute the type of market
failure that supports a finding of fair use.  The Court made clear, however, that fair use analysis must recognize the
copyright holder's rights to exploit cognizable markets for derivative works and that any use that occupies a
derivative market within the copyright owner's entitlements is not going to be a fair use. [FN177]
  The Court's importation of neoclassical economic analysis into fair use analysis has rendered fair use cases much
less complicated than they had been before.  Instead of operating as an "equitable rule of reason," [FN178] lower
courts can now decide fair use cases on the basis of market harm alone. After all, the Court has declared, and lower
courts have repeated, that "[c] ommercial uses are presumptively unfair" and that effect on the market is "by far the
most important factor."  As a result, if a use can be construed as a commercial use having an impact on any potential
licensing revenues, that use is not going to be a fair use.  Under this theory of fair use, once copyright owners devise
a mechanism for licensing a use, there is no longer any basis upon which to excuse the use as fair. [FN179]
  Pursuant to this narrow view of fair use, the digital environment *680  promises to reduce even further the
application of the doctrine.  The trend is to reduce fair use to narrowly defined instances of market failure,
predominantly where the transaction costs are too high to effect an exchange. [FN180]  Transactions in the digital
environment can be nearly costless, however.  "The principal economic benefit of rights-management containers is
the reduction in the transaction costs associated with intellectual property." [FN181]  Because computer technology
promises to reduce transaction costs considerably, fair use applications in the context of cyberspace stand to be
significantly narrowed. [FN182]  Instances of market failure due to transaction costs will decrease as technology
lowers transaction costs by increasing the practicality of numerous and quick market transactions between market
and use. [FN183] This theory would suggest that fair use is an "archaic privilege with little application to the digital
world."  The White Paper is a proponent of this development. [FN184]  The report suggests *681 that fair use should
be narrowed in light of copyright management technology and further states that the burden of showing fair use
should rest on the user. [FN185]
  Despite these problems, the DMCA avoided an express fair use privilege in favor of a narrowly constrained
substitute: the new law permits would-be fair users who desire to circumvent the technological controls restricting
access to protected works to participate in triennial administrative rulemakings to exempt works of the class they
mean to use fairly from the newly enacted legal prohibitions on unauthorized access. [FN186]  In response to
concerns that the DMCA's prohibition on circumventing rights-management technology would impair access to
copyrighted works for noninfringing uses, [FN187] Congress promulgated a two-year delay on the prohibition.
[FN188]  During this delay, the Librarian of Congress must determine whether the circumvention prohibition is
likely to adversely affect noninfringing uses of any particular class of copyright works during the succeeding three
years. [FN189]  The legislation requires the Librarian to revisit the question during each succeeding three- year
period as well. [FN190]  The circumvention prohibition will not apply to those classes of works for the relevant
three-year period. [FN191]
  This relief is somewhat illusory however.  The DMCA's prohibition on providing the very circumvention devices
or services noninfringing users need to circumvent technological protection, as the Act permits them to do for at
least two years, is currently effective. [FN192]  Thus, the Act effectively deprives the vast majority of noninfringing
users of the means of circumventing technological access controls. [FN193]
*682 C. Proposed Legislative Initiatives
  A further reduction of the public domain is at issue in two contemporary initiatives.  Copyright doctrine has always
held that the facts and ideas contained within a copyrighted work are part of the public domain. [FN194] Free access
to such ideas and facts is "the means by which copyright advances the progress of science." [FN195]  However, in
the proposed World Intellectual Property Organization Database Protection Treaty of 1996, the copyright, media,
and information industry representatives behind the Clinton Administration's White Paper sought protection of
otherwise uncopyrightable factual information within databases. [FN196]  The efforts to protect databases most
likely would have been successful in Congress had the legal and scientific research communities not vociferously
defended public access to scientific data. [FN197]  Although the proposed Database Protection Treaty was rejected,
three versions of a database protection bill have surfaced in the Congressional Record, and substantial pressure still
exists for adoption of a database protection measure in some form. [FN198]  The constitutionality of such protection
is dubious because it would grant copyright protection for collections of information that fail to meet the
constitutional copyright standard of originality as required by the Court. [FN199]  However, Congress appears
unwilling to "take seriously the Court's restriction on its power." [FN200]  Meanwhile, *683 supporters of these
initiatives "assure us that any erosion in copyright's nonprotection of ideas and information can be offset by a
generous application of the fair use doctrine." [FN201]  As noted above, however, fair use itself is an eroding
concept.
  The other initiative is a proposed model law that aspires to validate "shrink wrap licenses" as a matter of state
contract law. [FN202]  Shrinkwrap licenses are preprinted "licenses" contained inside of prepackaged software that
consumers theoretically "consent" to upon opening the shrinkwrap on the container. [FN203]  The enforceability of
such "licenses" has been open to debate under existing intellectual property and contract laws. [FN204] Proponents
of the model legislation seek to resolve that debate in favor of private rights, enabling licensors to dominate the
rights of the public in information transactions through the mechanism of private adhesion contracting. [FN205]  As
a result, private contract law could replace public intellectual property law in the cyberspace setting, directly
affecting the balance between private rights in, and public access to, information.
III Baseline Dilemmas: Privatization Versus Public Rights
  As the above discussion illustrates, copyright policy in an increasingly digital world is framed according to a
neoclassical economic paradigm that favors private rights.  As a result, copyright *684 doctrine has drifted from a
baseline of public rights to a presumption in favor of privatization.  This presumptive reasoning privileges property
norms over access norms, thus resetting the copyright entitlement from one focusing on public access to one
focusing on private rights in the private sphere of the marketplace.  When information is viewed as "public," our
legal system values access. [FN206]  When information is viewed as "private," however, our legal system values
protecting boundaries. [FN207]  Thus, the bias toward privatization has changed the nature of copyright entitlement
from a limited property right punctuated with access-based limitations, to a regime under which "open access is to
be eschewed." [FN208]  As a result, "new intellectual property rights are continually granted, and the public domain
continually cut back." [FN209]  The inherent privileging of privatization results in "structural tendencies in our
patterns of thinking and discourse about intellectual property that lead us generally to 'over' rather than 'under'
protect, and that partly as a result we are currently in the midst of an intellectual land-grab, an unprecedented
privatization of the public domain." [FN210]  These structural tendencies consist of baseline fallacies that "obscure
the interests of the public by foregrounding the interests of copyright owners." [FN211]
  Copyright has long been subject to debate as to whether the goals of copyright are "better served by treating
intellectual productivity as property, or (at least to some degree) as part of a commons that is open to all comers."
[FN212]  In drawing the line between public and the private domains of information, we should clearly recognize
what guiding principles we are prepared to follow.  In doing so, we must expose the baseline fallacies that privilege
the domination of conventional property ideas in copyright policy and, simultaneously, cast shadows of suspicion on
public rights to information.  These fallacies compel an inappropriate transfer of information distribution policy
from the public sphere to the private sphere.
*685 A. Exposing the Fallacies of a Privatization Baseline
  Neoclassical economic theory equates public interest with a maximization of total social wealth, regardless of the
distribution of that wealth.  A copyright system that uses wealth maximization as its touchstone "will often favor
whatever initial assignment of rights is proposed." [FN213]  Current copyright doctrine privileges maximum
privatization and the exploitation of new information markets created by the digital environment. [FN214]  Thus, it
has created a bias toward "enacting legislation that transforms into piracy any uncompensated use of copyrighted
works that could generate further revenue were it deemed infringement." [FN215]  This policy is built upon a
foundation of baseline fallacies that are so prevalent in neoclassical economic analysis.
  For example, proponents of strong property rights in information have recast traditional limitations on the scope of
copyright as loopholes. [FN216]  The corresponding implication is that the baseline from which to begin entitlement
analysis is for the copyright owner to have control over the right at issue. [FN217]  Strong protectionists argue that
copyright policy should not force copyright owners to support public access by requiring them to "donate" a portion
of "their" works to worthwhile public purposes.  In the words of the Clinton Administration's White Paper: "Users
are not granted any affirmative 'rights' under the Copyright Act; rather, copyright owners' rights are limited by
certain exemptions from user liability." [FN218]  Copyright's access-based limitations have become characterized as
forced donations [FN219] to the public, "cast in terms of good citizenship rather than entitlement." [FN220]  These
limitations that previously defined the scope of copyright have become a "tax" on the copyright holders [FN221] and
a subsidy to *686 the public.
  This baseline fallacy has spawned the protectionistic belief that the burden of persuasion on whether copyrights
should be protected "should be on those who seek to diminish copyright rights." [FN222]  This fallacy has been
particularly prevalent in the shaping of current fair use doctrine.  In fact, the fallacy has evolved into an initial
assignment of rights that prejudges the outcome in any fair use case.  As courts have recently begun to state: "Fair
use serves as an affirmative defense to a claim of copyright infringement, and thus the party claiming that its
secondary use of the original copyrighted work constitutes a fair use typically carries the burden of proof as to all
issues in dispute." [FN223]  Thus, current fair use analysis presumes that fair use is a defense to a copyright
infringement action rather than the baseline from which to begin the inquiry.  This presumption makes the initial
assignment of copyright protection to the party challenging the use, rather than assuming the use is fair unless
proven otherwise.  While this initial assignment may appear arbitrary, it is actually the inevitable result of a system
that favors private property rights over a public commons.  By prejudging where the burden of proof should be
located, the market paradigm constrains the likely answers. [FN224]
  Another baseline fallacy that has resulted in an initial assignment of rights that prejudges the outcome in fair use
cases is the neoclassical economic notion that copyright owners are entitled to exploit all existing or potential
markets for their works.  Proponents of strong copyright rights believe that the first principle of a contemporary
copyright philosophy should be inspired by the prevailing view that private property promotes the most efficient use
of property overall and that copyright is a property *687 right that ought to be respected as any other property right.
[FN225]  Along these lines, some believe that, as a baseline, copyright owners control all prospective markets
created by users. [FN226]  This neoclassical economic premise results in the view that privatization is preferable
wherever a market, or potential market, for copyrighted material exists.
  Current fair use analysis tends to concentrate on the potential market impact of the unauthorized copying.  If such a
potential market is found to exist, a use will rarely be found fair.  Pursuant to this view, fair use is just a narrow
exception to the "privatization" of intellectual property, applicable only in anomalistic cases of market failure.
[FN227]  As a result, fair use is ultimately viewed as a subsidy from the copyright owner in favor of uses that
benefit the public. [FN228]  This view has led some commentators to argue that "it is not clear why authors and
copyright owners should redistribute income to 'fair' users." [FN229]
  A recurring criticism of this analysis is that it is circular. [FN230]  It presumes a property right in order to establish
one.  "It purports to base legal protection upon economic value, when, as a matter of actual fact, the economic value
of a sales device depends upon the extent to which it will be legally protected." [FN231]  Proponents of a less
protectionist copyright philosophy observe a similar circular quality to a baseline of privatization that "distorts,
discounts, and marginalizes the extent to which the state is involved intimately with the creation, protection, and
promotion of the value *688 of this supposedly private property." [FN232]  The value that purports to justify
privatization actually "accrues as a result of state intervention through legal rules defining intellectual property
rights, not in spite of it." [FN233]
  Copyright has the effect of "privatizing" and thereby bringing into the market goods that would otherwise be free
to all.  The longstanding convention that authors have a copyright in their works deflects attention from the fact that
copyright is itself an intervention in the market, rather than, as it so often is made to appear, the "natural" way of
things. [FN234]
  Furthermore, copyright owners have never been presumptively entitled to control all uses of their works.  "United
States copyright was never absolute; the Constitution has always limited it, both in time and in purpose." [FN235]
Every copyright statute since the Statute of Anne has promoted access by according copyright owners some
exclusive rights, and reserving other rights to the general public. [FN236]  In fact, until 1976, public dissemination
was, except in very limited circumstances, a condition of copyright. [FN237]
  Intellectual property rights are limited monopolies conferred in order to produce present and future public benefit.
For the purposes of achieving those goals, the "limitations" on the right are just as important as the grant of the right
itself.  To put it more accurately, since there is no "natural" absolute intellectual property right, the doctrines which
favor consumers and other users, such as fair use, are just as much a part of the basic right as the entitlement of the
author to prevent certain kinds of *689 copying. [FN238]
  Because copyright is an affirmative statutory grant, the baseline entitlement of access should remain with the
public.  The burdens on copyright "limit the scope of the owner's proprietary rights in deference to the community's
claim to access to and use of expression." [FN239]  Thus, if copyright doctrine allows certain unauthorized uses,
there is no reason to view that policy as taking away rights from authors.  Rather, Congress has simply chosen not to
extend that particular right to copyright holders in the first place.  The "disadvantaged" copyright owner is yielding
something which was arguably not his or hers in the first place.
  If the initial scheme of copyright law simply does not give authors the right to control certain uses of their works,
then it does not make sense to speak of a "donation" of these uses to the public.  Instead of copyright's traditional
limitations existing as a tax or a forced subsidy on the copyright holder's property, it is the copyright holder who is
receiving the limited right to control and profit from what would otherwise be the public's property.  Thus, "the
public is not seen as illegitimately 'usurping' the prerogatives of actors in the private sphere, but instead is thought of
as creating, maintaining, and indeed underwriting its very existence." [FN240]
B. Promoting a Baseline of Public Rights
  The baseline fallacies employed by neoclassical economic analysis have come  "to justify ever-increasing property
rights in information itself--a result directly counter to understandings of early English and American copyright law,
which prohibited unauthorized copying of texts precisely to promote wider circulation of the ideas, knowledge, and
information contained within such literary works." [FN241]  This shift in the rules is "carving out entirely new legal
domains-some of them public and some of them private-on the frontiers of information." [FN242]  Recent
developments in copyright policy premised on these baseline fallacies described *690 above represent an
extraordinary privatization of the public domain. [FN243]  Pamela Samuelson has criticized proponents of such
privatization as authorizing a "copyright grab" and effecting a "wholesale giveaway" of the public's rights. [FN244]
The casualty is the abandonment of the late nineteenth/early twentieth century quest for a socially optimal balance of
public-private interests that characterize the development of property over the last 100 years.  The favored
paradigms demarcating the public and private spheres of information in the digital environment promise to impact
the form and content of the public "space" in that environment.
  During the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, a modern public sphere emerged from new cultural practices and
venues of communication. [FN245] New communications institutions such as coffeehouses, salons, literary societies
and the press
    allowed for the creation of a "philosophy of discourse" that was central to liberal democratic practices.  The
literary public sphere provided an uninhibited exchange of ideas and opinions, and this cultural activity was
independent from the singularly private economic interests of individuals and also from the domination of the state.
[FN246]
  This new and independent cultural sphere decisively drew upon increased exposure to cultural commodities,
especially the "published word." [FN247]
  The United States, however, is currently suffering a "vanishing of public space." [FN248]  The trend toward
suburbanization has resulted in a situation where there are "no town halls, no granges, no public squares, no
downtown churches or galleries or schools" within which to engage in public discourse. [FN249]  Public squares are
being replaced by suburban spaces that have "nothing public about them." [FN250]  Such spaces are private
property "dominated by *691 a single pervasive activity: consumerism." [FN251]  Furthermore, the public sphere
created on the basis of the proliferation of new communication institutions has been lost to consumerism and the
mass media. [FN252]  As a result, civil society has diminished and its by-product, civic culture, has declined.
[FN253]
  Cyberspace has the potential to replace a diminishing physical public space.  Indeed, it has already become
commonplace to describe the operation of the new digital technologies in spatial terms.  Information technology is
becoming known as the "electronic super highway." [FN254]  This highway metaphor is particularly apt given the
ability of computer-based communications to cut across territorial borders.  Such spatial terms imply "that the
removal of spatial barriers combined with the high level of online interaction creates a feeling among those
electronically connected that they are indeed in the same place even though they are physically separated by great
distances." [FN255]  Thus, despite the absence of physical space, there is "a spatial dimension in which our
communications with one another occur." [FN256]
  As a result, we can view cyberspace as supplanting physical space [FN257] as a "tool that . . . might help revitalize
the public sphere." [FN258] Computer technology has advanced to a point where individuals on opposite sides of
the world may instantaneously exchange information. [FN259] Internet technology enables people to "meet, and
talk, and live in cyberspace in ways not possible in real-space." [FN260]  Thus, it has the "potential to connect
people in new ways as solutions to the problem of declining community in *692 modern America." [FN261]
  As digital information becomes increasingly privatized, however, the question arises whether public, open spaces
on the Internet are being compromised.  The prevailing proprietary attitude toward cyberspace vests control in
private interests that are free to exclude whomever they choose. This perspective "has taken the law in the same
direction: towards more limited public access to ideas and information. . . .  Extrapolated into a comprehensive
information policy, the trend is frightening." [FN262]
  To read a book, listen to a song, scan an encyclopedia, pass along a newspaper article to a friend, exchange recipes
and furniture-finishing instructions with a neighbor-these were communicational activities encouraged within liberal
democracies with an Enlightenment faith in the progress of arts and sciences.  The same activities may well be
deemed forms of theft-illegal trespassing upon private property-in the digital environment.  Despite its limitations
and prejudices, the bourgeois public sphere may appear to be a very open and dialogical space to industry forces
eager to impose a private police state upon cyberspace. [FN263]
  The conjunction of legitimate private and public interests in the copyright arena suggests that ordinary, unqualified
notions of ownership are not satisfactory in this area.  "[B]efore we succumb to calls for further enhancement of the
rights in the copyright bundle, we need to reexamine the intellectual property bargain from the vantage point of the
public, on whose behalf, after all, the copyright deal is said to be struck in the first place." [FN264]  In devising a
copyright policy that meets the public's needs, we might most profitably abandon copyright law's traditional reliance
on privatization and start instead from a baseline of inherent public rights.  We should equate public interest with
access rather than wealth maximization. [FN265] Only then can we successfully assert the public's interest in the
copyright bargain.
  A public interest equated with access is compatible with the *693 underlying Enlightenment ideology upon which
copyright is based.  "[C] opyright law serves fundamentally to underwrite a democratic culture." [FN266]  Access to
information is of central importance to this copyright policy. [FN267] As stated by Pamela Samuelson, copyright
policy is
    traceable to the belief of the framers of the Constitution that unfettered and widespread dissemination of
information would promote technological and economic progress.  The drafters of the Constitution, educated in the
Enlightenment tradition, shared that era's legacy of faith in the enabling powers of knowledge for society as well as
the individual. [FN268]
  The framers "viewed free access to knowledge as an essential step in building the fledgling nation." [FN269]
Thus, in order for copyright to achieve its "constitutive agenda" [FN270] the public must have access to copyrighted
works. [FN271]  "The public gains access to the ideas explicitly or implicitly from its access to the expressions."
[FN272]  The digital environment, therefore, should remain a model of diverse and open access and public
discourse.  Thus, we should be in favor of a policy "privileging substantial uses of copyrighted material in the
interest of an asserted policy favoring access." [FN273]
  "The modern defenders of an open Internet take the position that the free exchange of ideas is a kind of comedy of
the commons, where total creativity is enhanced by open access and interaction among all entrants' ideas." [FN274]
According to Martha *694 Woodmansee, the view of the public nature of information was once common. [FN275]
In her book tracing the history of copyright, Woodmansee describes a view, prevalent until the late eighteenth
century, that an author was a mere craftsman transcribing ideas already in the public domain, and, by extension, an
author's work was in the public domain as well. [FN276]
  "With land, the view that resources should remain open to unconstrained common entry is extremely limited; only
in quite special circumstances does unrestricted public use of land seem to result in 'comedy'--that is, a happy and
productive outcome--rather than 'tragedy."' [FN277]  The contest of property versus commons in copyright
discourse is much more evenly divided, however.  Copyright is a statutorily created grant.  Instead of being viewed
as a bargain between the government and a private copyright owner, copyright is said to be a bargain between the
government and the public. [FN278]
  Information subject to a copyright grant is inherently public property that the government privatizes in the public's
interest.  Without government involvement, information would exist in a publicly owned commons for all to access.
Thus, "[c]opyright is a perfect candidate for the Lockean and Millian concept of stewardship property." [FN279]
Pursuant to this stewardship, cyberspace technology should not be subjected to copyright's current presumption of
privatization. [FN280]  It is better viewed as an information commons and a public space for discourse. [FN281]
Instead of presumptively favoring privatization, we should be privileging "a commons of knowledge held in trust."
[FN282]  We should recognize the value of open access to the public at large as a baseline from which to begin any
copyright inquiry, especially given the new *695 digital environment.  A public trust paradigm would require that
the government start from just such a baseline.
IV The Public Trust Doctrine
  The public trust doctrine has served, in the United States, as the foundation and framework of modern legal
conceptions concerning the ownership of common resources.  Thus, this doctrine naturally looms behind the
foregoing discussion of public and private rights in information resources.  It makes sense to draw upon the public
trust doctrine, with "its intimations of guardianship, responsibility, and community," [FN283] when forming
information policy in a digital world.  The public trust doctrine can reinvigorate incentive rhetoric by providing
substance to a copyright agenda favoring public rights to access.
  Margaret Chon has argued that information should be viewed "as a natural resource commons, such as air or water,
which is held in a public trust." [FN284]  Keith Aoki has similarly touched on this notion. [FN285]  While Chon
advocates that information be subject to a public trust and Aoki suggests that public trust doctrine can inform
copyright policy by analogy, neither describe the contours of the public trust doctrine or why information should be
viewed as a public trust resource.  In the balance of this Article, I move into territory which is suggested but not
fully addressed in Chon's and Aoki's works.  I will first trace the theory of the public trust doctrine and assert that
information does meet the criteria of a public trust resource.  I argue that, pursuant to the public trust doctrine, the
public may hold some legitimate form of private property interest in information resources.
A. The Origins of the Public Trust Doctrine
  The public trust doctrine is a background property principle with a hefty pedigree.  As originally constituted, "the
doctrine held that some resources, particularly lands beneath navigable *696 waters or washed by the tides, are . . .
inherently the property of the public at large." [FN286]  The doctrine dictates that the sovereign state holds the
subject lands in trust for the benefit of the public.  The doctrine was based on the notion that public access to
navigable waters and subjective lands is so important that it should be held in a commons for special treatment.
  "The modern public trust doctrine traces its origins to Byzantine law- specifically, the Justinian Code's statement
that 'By natural law, these things are common property of all: air, running water, the sea, and with it the shores of the
sea."' [FN287]  Most medieval European legal systems eventually adopted this principle. [FN288]  Imported from
England, [FN289] the public trust principle became part of American common law. [FN290]
  The American view that the government should have a proprietary interest with respect to lands that are important
to the public began in the 1820's when navigational commerce was important.  Significant cases expressed a
fiduciary aspect of state sovereign ownership; the state had a duty to manage such resources in a way that facilitates
public use.  For example, the New Jersey Supreme Court in the early case of Arnold v. Mundy, [FN291] restricted a
private party's ability to own oyster beds submerged in a river.  The case involved an objection to the privatization
of oyster beds that impaired public use of the beds.  The court held that navigable waters, and the land beneath, are
common to all citizens.  The property is vested in the sovereign for the use of the citizen.  Arnold marks the origin of
the fiduciary aspect of public trust doctrine.  This notion developed into the extension *697 that the public itself
might enjoy a property right to public resources.
  Early public trust questions arose in the area of legislative abrogation: What happens when legislation deprives the
public of the use of public trust resources?  In fact, legislative abrogation led the United States Supreme Court to
rely on the public trust doctrine for the first time in Illinois Central, [FN292] the seminal public trust case.  That case
concerned an attempt by the Illinois legislature to rescind its earlier grant to the railroad of most of the land along
the Chicago waterfront.  The Court ruled in favor of the State, concluding that the original grant was void because
the State did not have the power to alienate property in which the public had a trust interest in purposes such as
navigation and fishing. [FN293]
  Illinois Central established the basic principle that the public holds rights in certain water resources that limit the
power of legislative representatives to alienate such resources. [FN294]  In the decades following Illinois Central, a
number of courts, especially in Wisconsin and Florida, held that the public enjoyed rights in various types of
waterways, which served to limit the legislature's ability to alienate those resources. [FN295]
B. The Expansion of the Public Trust Doctrine
  "The public trust doctrine has enjoyed a significant renaissance over the last twenty-five years as a tool for judicial
review of government decisions to alienate natural resources." [FN296]  Since 1970, courts from at least twenty-five
American jurisdictions have embraced some form of the public trust doctrine. [FN297]  The doctrine has become
viewed as "a tool for judicial supervision of resource-allocation decisions." [FN298]  Thus, in recent years, "many
courts have relied on the doctrine to impose limits both on the government's ability to alienate natural resources, and
on the government's and private owners' ability to use such resources in ways deemed incompatible with the public
trust with which the resource *698 was found to be impressed." [FN299]
  "Paralleling this widespread recognition has been a broadening of the doctrine to include resources not previously
within its scope." [FN300]  As a result, the public trust doctrine has been expanded by a number of state and federal
courts that hold that certain natural resources other than waterways are imbued with the public trust.  In this sense,
the public trust doctrine has developed into a "dynamic" doctrine that evolves with the demands of society to protect
public uses of trust lands.  Courts have become receptive to requests to extend the doctrine beyond its traditional
water-related focus.  The public trust doctrine has been invoked to support claims for the preservation of any number
types of property deemed public resources including wildlife, [FN301] parks, [FN302] marshlands, [FN303]
historical areas, [FN304] cemeteries, [FN305] archeological sites [FN306] and remains, [FN307] and works of art.
[FN308]  The doctrine has also extended the concept of public trust purposes to include, for example, recreation.
[FN309]
  Furthermore, in addition to protecting public use rights, the public trust doctrine has also been interpreted to
impose a sovereign duty of environmental stewardship for the benefit of the public.  For example, the California
Supreme Court has determined that the public trust doctrine serves an essential role in the integrated system of
California water law by preserving the continuing *699 sovereign power of the state to protect public trust uses.
[FN310]  The court found this power to preclude any water user from acquiring a vested right to harm the public
trust, and that it imposes a continuing duty on state officials to consider such uses when allocating water resources.
  Thus, the public trust has developed into an inherent limitation on a myriad of public trust resources; a type of
background principle that limits title. For example, beach property in Oregon has been presumed to be subject to an
inherent limitation of public beach access. [FN311]  Some now argue that resources impressed with the public trust
belong to the public in such a way that the public's property claims override the acts of its own agents, even the
legislature. [FN312]  Thus, the doctrine authorizes courts to step in with respect to legislative impairments of public
use.
C. Identifying a Public Trust Resource
  The recent expansion of the public trust doctrine suggests the basis of an even more expanded role for the doctrine.
[FN313]  However, critics of the modern public trust doctrine argue that the scope of resources coming under its
protection has expanded beyond all relation to the doctrine's historical focus on water-based resources. [FN314]
Thus, the difficulty becomes determining how to distinguish "public trust" resources from those resources that are
not "impressed with the public trust." [FN315]  Two influential public trust scholars help identify the criteria.
1. Joseph Sax: Process Defects
  In his watershed 1970 article, which marked the modern renewal of the public trust doctrine, Joseph Sax said that
"public trust law is not so much a substantive set of standards for dealing with the public domain as it is a technique
by which courts may mend perceived imperfections in the legislative and administrative process." [FN316]  Through
his analysis, Sax modernized the concept *700 of the public trust doctrine, using this vivid phrase as a vehicle for
insisting that public bodies pay attention to--and adequately vindicate--the changing public interest in diffuse
resources. [FN317]
  Sax examined a number of cases challenging state transfers of public land to a private party on the grounds that the
land was impressed with a public trust use that the proposed grantee would impair or destroy.  He found in these
cases a judicial concern for "low visibility decision making," which he characterizes as a situation in which
important resource-allocation decisions are made without a great deal of publicity or official notice.  Without such
notice, the public is not alerted and thus its interests are often not heard or considered. [FN318]  Sax determined that
the public trust doctrine "tries to identify and correct those situations in which it is most likely that there has been an
inequality of access to, and influence with, decision makers so that there is a grave danger that the democratic
processes are not working effectively." [FN319]  Thus, Sax viewed the public trust doctrine as a response to
perceived defects in the political or administrative process that cause decision makers to systematically undervalue a
particular consideration. [FN320]
  Sax's view of the public trust tied into an emerging "public choice" theory, which argued that sharply focused
minority interests could often get their way in legislatures at the expense of diffuse majorities. [FN321] Meanwhile,
in the administrative arena, "capture" theorists described the similar ways that regulated interests could take over the
very public agencies that supposedly regulated them. [FN322]  Sax asserted that the public trust doctrine provides a
means to correct such "imperfections" in governmental natural resource decision making. [FN323]
  In his article, Sax identified two sources of such "imperfect" decisions.  [FN324]  The first systemic defect is
decision making at an inappropriate level of government, resulting in a lack of consideration *701 of important
resource-conservation interests. [FN325]  According to Sax, this problem results in the more broadly distributed
benefits of conservation being undervalued relative to the (usually economic) benefits of alienating the resource.
[FN326]  The second process defect Sax recognized is the phenomenon of allocation decisions he characterizes as
"low-visibility," including those made by an administrative agency or by means of a governmental grant of land title
to a private party. [FN327]  According to Sax, the relative invisibility of such decisions means that they do not
attract the notoriety necessary to inform and energize the general public, whose interests these decisions may harm.
[FN328]
  In such cases, the public trust doctrine authorizes an inquiry into whether  "the government [has] granted to some
private interest the authority to make resource-use decisions which may subordinate broad public resource uses to
that private interest." [FN329]  The doctrine inquires whether "there [has] been an attempt to reallocate diffuse
public uses either to private uses or to public uses which have less breadth." [FN330]  Sax's ideas regarding "diffuse
interests" is backed up by empirical observations that suggest that large but diffuse interests quite often seem to be
the sort systematically undervalued by the political process. [FN331]
  Presumably, this analysis would justify judicial review in any area in which the government transfers some sort of
right to a private party under circumstances raising suspicion that public rights are being sacrificed to rent-seeking
interests without a countervailing increase in public welfare. This sort of situation could be expected to appear
whenever the public's interest can be described as diffuse. [FN332]
  Even Richard Epstein, a dominant proponent of private property rights, views public trust theory as preventing the
government from colluding with the various "rent-seekers" who attempt to use the political process to redistribute
the wealth of others to themselves.  If the public trust represents property belonging to the public, inalienable by
their purported agents in the legislature *702(or alienable only under sharp restrictions), then, Epstein argues, the
doctrine's true function is to restrain legislators from giving away the store for private gain to the general detriment
of the public at large. [FN333]
2. Carol Rose: Socialization
  Carol Rose has also explored the characteristics of property that inherently belongs to the public. [FN334]  In a
1986 article, Rose examined the fact that nineteenth century American courts embraced doctrines under which
certain property was deemed owned by the public, not as government property but as held by the public at large.
According to Rose, these courts used doctrines such as prescription, custom, and (especially after Illinois Central)
the public trust doctrine to find roadways and rivers to be inherently public property primarily because of their
commerce-enhancing functions. [FN335] Rose observed that the courts' willingness to embrace such doctrines, even
during the nineteenth century exaltation of private property, was based on an understanding that certain property was
most valuable as such inherently public property.  As interpreted by Rose, those decisions reflected a conclusion that
the highest use of those resources lay in public ownership, open to public use. [FN336]  Pursuant to this analysis, the
social benefits created by public ownership of or access to, a resource may justify scrutiny of government decisions
to privatize such resources, or at least scrutiny of the procedure by which those decisions are reached. [FN337]
  Pursuant to Rose's analysis, the main thrust of the public trust doctrine was "to reserve for the public those
properties that the public needs for travel, communication, commerce, and to some degree public speaking-that is,
uses that connect people with one another and with a wider world and allow all to interact in a social whole."
[FN338]  These types of inherently public resources generally enable people to interact with one another more *703
productively and civilly. [FN339]  For example, Rose found that property most needful for commerce is a traditional
candidate for "publicness." [FN340]  She found a similar social connection to recreation and speech as foundations
of public property. [FN341]
  Rose's views of "publicness" tracks the "publicness" of water law, to which public trust doctrine is connected.
[FN342]  According to Rose, water law "is a fount of doctrine for public resource management, since water is
indeed a diffuse resource with a long history of community management."  She observes that water rights have
always had some elements of communal management. [FN343]  The general public is viewed as having a special
interest in and claim over water resources that shapes how water can be allocated and used. [FN344]  Joseph Sax has
used several different terms to describe and explain water's special "publicness," reflecting the multifaceted nature
of the public's claim.  Sax often notes that water is a "public commons," emphasizing the open access to waterways
that the public has traditionally enjoyed for navigation, fishing, recreation, and aesthetic enjoyment. [FN345]  Open
access to waterways often can increase the total social value of the waterways by maximizing common public use.
[FN346]  Thus, the rights to such access is best retained by the public.
  Furthermore, the special relationship between community and water has also resulted in water being viewed as an
inherently public resource.  Sax emphasizes the inescapable importance of water to the development and
sustainability of society.  Water is constitutive of community.  Water not only sustains life itself, but is also the
essential basis for the creation of community. [FN347]  "The *704 quantity and quality of water available to a
community thus supports and constrains the community's economy and lifestyle, and, as a corollary, the rules
governing its use and protection can 'affect the fate of the whole community."' [FN348] The central importance of
water to communities' development and sustainability has spawned universal rules against waste, as well as
provisions in many western state constitutions asserting ultimate state ownership over water. [FN349]
  Rose's analysis suggests that a judicial calculation focusing on the "publicness" of resources that contribute to
socialization might serve as the substantive basis for a doctrine giving special protection for and expanded category
of public trust resources today. [FN350]  The socializing and democratizing effects that commerce was thought to
have in the nineteenth century are effectuated today through many other public activities such as recreation. [FN351]
V A Public Trust Paradigm for Copyright
  The discussion above asserts that there are substantive values underlying the public trust doctrine.  Certain
resources are inherent to community socialization and thus, there is substantial worth in the public's custody of such
resources.  Moreover, the nature of this value as inhering in a diffuse group makes intervention necessary, given the
difficulty of effectuating that interest in the political-administrative process.  Both of these intertwined justifications
for designating a resource as a public trust resource apply to information in a digital world.  Thus, the "modern
echoes" of the public trust doctrine can be heard "in discussions of public claims to use communications media
freely--notably the Internet, where current debate rages over the degree to which intellectual property should lock
the doors on information transfer." [FN352]
A. Information as a Public Trust Resource
  "The fate of most things is of interest only to its owner.  Some *705 objects, however, regardless of who owns
them, are important to a larger community." [FN353]  Information is one of those "objects."  The larger community
has a legitimate stake in the privatization of the digital environment because the information flowing through that
environment embodies ideas, as well as scientific and historic information.  The Internet functions as a powerful
new medium of distribution and communication. [FN354]  The "stock of trade" in cyberspace is information.
[FN355]  Thus, the Internet, including its user-friendly interface, the World Wide Web, is now the iconic form of the
information society. [FN356]  This heightened access to and exchange of information will transform the public and
private lives of many. [FN357]  As the District Court said in American Civil Liberties Union  v. Reno:
    It is no exaggeration to conclude that the Internet has achieved, and continues to achieve, the most participatory
marketplace of mass speech that this country-and indeed the world-has yet seen.  The plaintiffs in these actions
correctly describe the "democratizing" effects of Internet communication: individual citizens of limited means can
speak to a worldwide audience on issues of concern to them. . . . [As such it] deserves the broadest possible
protection. [FN358]
  Although the fate of information policy in this arena concerns the community as a whole, however, "we have
chosen, perhaps not entirely knowledgeably, the marketplace as the most desirable mechanism for distributing
information in developed economies." [FN359]
1. Process Defects of Copyright Policy
  As Joseph Sax has pointed out, structural flaws in the decision *706 making processes involving diffuse natural
resources result in a government likely to make decisions that undervalue the public's interest in those resources.
Copyright policy governing the assignment of rights to information suffers from the same defective processes that
Sax has identified as justifying the application of public trust to certain land resources.  As a result, these decisions
seriously undervalue the public's interest in information resources.  Furthermore, this privatization campaign is
largely waged beyond the notice of the general public.  Thus, it has resulted in a situation in which "what members
of the public think of as ordinary use of copyrighted works [is], in fact, flagrant piracy." [FN360]  As Jessica
Litman, a noted copyright scholar and legislative historian has observed, "copyright owners may well have won a
rhetorical battle the rest of the country never realized was being fought." [FN361]
  This defective decision making is a direct result of at least two problems identified by Sax as justifying the
application of the public trust doctrine. First, copyright decisions are made by sharply focused minority interests at
the expense of a diffuse public interest.  The operation of public choice theory--explaining how "trade" among self-
interested politicians, public officials and private interest groups can produce laws which are adverse to the public
interest [FN362]--is clearly evidenced in the processes affecting copyright policy.  Second, the public's diffuse
interests in information resources are systematically undervalued by the political process by which copyright
doctrine is fashioned.  As a result, *707 copyright doctrine has developed into a narrow "private property analysis"
that fails to reveal its true costs to the public interest.
a. A Domination of Minority Interests
  An examination of the groups that exert influence on the copyright process reveals a cartellization of the
negotiations by a handful of industries with economic interests in copyright who successfully pursue their own
agenda at the expense of the public.  Such an examination also discloses the capture by these industries of all the key
administrative intellectual property offices, which have increasingly become voices for big industry seeking to make
law with little regard for the public interest. [FN363]  Congress has encouraged these special interests to frame the
copyright agenda, inevitably leading proposed legislation that Congress is then supposed to, and does, rubber-
stamp.  Congress's abdication in the copyright arena results in a "legislative process that repeatedly produces results
that tend to favor powerful and wealthy constituencies." [FN364]
  Jessica Litman has described at length the capture of the law-making process in the area of copyright.  According
to Litman, Congress "has since the turn of the century, been delegating the policy choices in copyright matters to the
industries affected by copyright." [FN365]  In a 1987 article, [FN366] Litman described the process by which
Congress enacted the 1976 Copyright Act and stated that the statute made "a number of fundamental changes in the
American copyright system, including some so profound that they may mark a shift in direction for the very
philosophy of copyright itself." [FN367]
  *708 After scrutinizing the legislative history behind the statute, Litman determined that the Act was not actually
drafted by anyone in Congress. [FN368]  Actually, "the language evolved through a process of negotiation among
authors, publishers, and other parties with economic interests in the property rights the statute defines." [FN369]
The entire statute was drafted before Congress was included in any legislative revision. [FN370] The congressional
sponsors of the bill probably gave almost no thought to the statute. [FN371]  The bill owed very little of its
substance to the members of Congress that debated it. [FN372]
  The resulting copyright statute represented precisely what one might have expected to evolve from negotiations
among parties with economic interests in copyright.  The bill granted authors expansive rights covering any
conceivable present and future uses of copyrighted works, and defined those uses very broadly.  It then provided
specific, detailed exemptions for those interests whose representatives had the bargaining power to negotiate.  All
uses not expressly exempted remained within the control of the copyright owner.  The bill, therefore, solved the
problem of defining the rights in uses made possible through future technology by reserving those rights to the
copyright owner. [FN373]
  The statute's codification of the fair use doctrine provided the sole safe harbor for an unrepresented public with
interests too diffuse to coalesce into a position of bargaining power. [FN374]  As described above, this harbor is
hardly safe given that it has been recast as a remedy for market failure rather than a public entitlement.
  Because the 1976 Act was composed by representatives of copyright-related industries to govern interactions
among them, [FN375] it tends to concentrate the distribution of copyrighted materials into the hands of a few, be it
the press, publishers, entertainment conglomerates, the media of broadcasting, cable and, increasingly, satellite.
These copyright industries are very powerful and *709 are increasing their influence on government policy. [FN376]
In laying the ground rules for the digital environment, these companies prefer that the distribution of property rights
over informational resources be designed to "lock in" the power of current market leaders and enable current
stakeholders to retain their dominance in the marketplace. [FN377]  The success of this preference results in a high
protectionist agenda that really represents the interests of only a few corporations. [FN378]
  This industry capture "significantly undermines the geography of  'public' and 'private' with respect to intellectual
property law." [FN379] "The regulatory capture of United States copyright law by private copyright- based
industries works at cross-purposes with the interests of the public- comprised of private individual users of
copyrighted works-which copyright law is theoretically supposed to advance." [FN380]
b. Diffuse Public Interests
  Although government accountability over "public disposal of extremely valuable rights would seem to demand a
vastly more informed politics of intellectual property in the information age," [FN381] a grass-roots revolt of
copyright users seems unlikely.  Until very recently, there was not a single public or private organization charged
with the task of protecting and preserving the public domain. [FN382]  Litman has noted that the general public's
interest in copyright legislation is unfocused.  The costs of the action are spread out over many people, while the
benefits redound mainly to a few easily identified and well-organized groups. [FN383]  The costs of privatizing
information to, for example, education and public debate, are individually small. [FN384]  Because there is no place
in the debate for the public, the public interest disappears *710 from view.  As a result, the structure of copyright
discourse in the legislative arena tends to undervalue the public domain. [FN385]
  The dark side to the increased access to information cyberspace provides is a decrease in grass-roots control over
the use and consequences of information. [FN386]  The result of this dark side is illustrated by the Clinton
Administration's White Paper.  It is essentially an advocacy document for copyright industries. [FN387]  Therefore,
it gives voice to only one side of the complicated policy debates involving public interests. [FN388]  The report
comes down firmly on the side of increased rights for copyright owners and it endorses the goal of enhanced
copyright protection without acknowledging any countervailing public concerns. [FN389]  This failure in the
process explains why there is no provision in the White Paper securing the public's opportunity to read, see, hear, or
download copyrighted works. [FN390]
  As a result of the very process deficiencies articulated by Sax with respect to natural resource allocation, copyright
policy will inevitably fail to "adjust to the importance that intellectual property has and is going to have in an
information society." [FN391]  Rather, private rights will continue to expand, unchecked by public scrutiny or
balanced discourse.  This consolidation of information rights has become self-fortifying.  As Litman has observed,
commercial copyright holders "are clinging to their *711 windfall protections with a tenacity that has apparently
made it politically impossible to divest them." [FN392]
2. Information as a Component of Socialization
  Like water and other inherently public resources, information is an important component of socialization.  As
Joseph Sax has noted: "Recognition that our accumulated knowledge and insight should be viewed as elements of a
common heritage undergirds the basic premise of intellectual-property rules that govern patents and copyrights."
[FN393]  In fact, the Office of Technology Assessment ("OTA") has reported to Congress a view of information that
clearly echoes the qualities Carol Rose noted in public trust resources. According to the OTA:
    Although the ruling monarchsof Europe had regarded the widespread dissemination of information with
considerable alarm, the opposite view prevailed in the United States.  Building a nation required the establishment of
communication links, the development of a unified market, the forging of a common culture, and the building of a
democratic party.  The widespread flow of information was essential to accomplish these tasks, and the
establishment of an intellectual property system, they believed, would aid the creation and spread of information.
[FN394]
  This constitutive view of information is especially vital in the context of the digital environment.  The Internet is
now evolving into the dominant communications medium of the developed world.  As a result, the Internet has
rapidly become an influential social, economic, and political force of modern society. [FN395]  Thus, the digital
environment "may be transformed into the 'Great Community' in which information can be widely disseminated as
never before." [FN396]
  "Like most legal forms and processes, copyright law is a part of the making of culture." [FN397]  Policymakers
"should make themselves aware of the far- ranging implications that the legal rules under consideration may have on
the future of virtual and real *712 community life." [FN398]  As with other public trust resources, the significant
socialization benefits that accrue from a public commons of information justify a public access focus for copyright.
[FN399]
  The digital environment promises to be an especially revolutionary influence on society due to the "reflexivity" of
information, "that is, its capacity to influence human social practices, which in turn influence knowledge
production." [FN400]  Almost all social organization results from communication. [FN401]  "The signs and symbols
used by the members of a community serve as a focal point and embodiment of collective meaning and memory."
[FN402]  "Social and scientific facts are so embedded in such language and theory that their meaning can be
understood only through discourse.  For human beings, the external universe is thus determined, more than
described, by expression and communication." [FN403]  Communications technology promises to transform
"modern society into the postmodern [FN404] information society, a society in which knowledge continually
reflects back into social practices." [FN405]  As a result, this new environment will dramatically influence the
shared norms that will form the basis of community. Such norms are, in turn, continuously reinforced through
increased social interaction. [FN406]
  Consequently, the new communications climate provides a modern  "environment where new relationships with
people and groups are fostered, and where new relationships begin to occur between people and institutions."
[FN407]  Digital technology is already creating a new realm of human activity. [FN408]  "By cutting across the
distances of space and time, it makes possible a sense *713 of belonging, and 'of participation in a common human
enterprise."' [FN409]  "A new environment not only brings about changes in specific behavior, but also changes in
positions, interests, expectations, relationships and attitudes." [FN410]  Thus, like the new communications
institutions of the previous centuries, the digital environment is likely to spawn a new cultural sphere as a function
of the medium's interactive nature, the ease with which digital information can be manipulated, and new searching
and linking capabilities.
  Our current legal institutions dealing with information promise to impact the form and content of this public space:
    Much of the information protected by intellectual property laws constitutes our polity, society and culture.
Although those intellectual property laws were intended to encourage individuals to contribute to the body of
information which makes up our culture, those laws create property rights which privatize the very stuff upon which
our culture is based. [FN411]
  Copyright policy's tendency to privilege privatization of cyberspace threatens to bring the power of commerce to
bear on the open space of the digital environment.  As a result, the digital environment's role as a civil domain may
give way to the creation of yet another market institution.  Instead of communicating with one another "as
neighbors, as friends, as collaborators, quite literally, even when they are strangers, as 'commoners,' in other words,
in the broadest generic sense, as citizens," [FN412] communicants in the digital environment will interact "as
producers or consumers or clients in the economic market." [FN413]
  The implications of a commodified digital environment, where private ownership is pervasive, are not difficult to
project.  Contrary to traditional forms of mass communication, which tend to concentrate communications power in
a limited number of hands, anyone with access to the Internet can interact with the rapidly expanding cyberspace
audience.  Privatization of this resource leads, however, to the likely prospect of an "information society" dominated
by privately-owned industries as proprietary *714 rights in information become held by an increasingly concentrated
number of corporate entities. [FN414] The penchant for privatization has already diminished the physical public
sphere:
    [T]he mass media today are the public sphere and . . . this is the reason for the degradation of public life if not its
disappearance.  Public life, the argument goes, has been transformed by a massive process of commodification of
culture and of political culture in particular by a form of communication increasingly based on emotionally charged
images rather than on rational discourse, such that political discourse has been degraded to the level of
entertainment, and cultural consumerism has been substituted for democratic participation. [FN415]
  Public space in the digital environment is likely to succumb to the same pressures currently diminishing public
space in the physical environment.
  A copyright theory for the digital environment that stresses a marketplace domain will result in a "uniformitarian
commercial culture." [FN416]  "In a domain in which success is measured by profit, however, neither political nor
cultural expression is necessarily very secure." [FN417]  The market will provide the infrastructure for the
circulation of cultural commodities.  The commodification of cultural products transforms the discourses of the
public sphere into a form of "manipulative publicity." [FN418]  Consider the "manipulation of public taste, attitude
and thought to suit the profit- maximizing requirements of the commercial enterprises that provide us with
expression." [FN419]  When viewed through a market paradigm, expression is solely an instrument whose value is
determined by its profitability.  Thus, content providers in a digital environment would select and distribute
information "for the purpose of profit-maximization, rather than self- expression." [FN420]
  Publishers' market-imposed profit orientation requires that they pursue the largest audience.  To accomplish this,
they must direct their products to whatever their market researchers tell them is the lowest common denominator of
consumer attitude *715 and taste.  Moreover, publishers have every incentive to seek to manipulate consumer taste
in order to increase market share and profits at the lowest possible cost. [FN421]
  Filtering certain modes of discourse through a sieve of profitability would result in a "flat and vapid cultural life."
[FN422]  Thus, the privatization of the digital environment threatens to "homogenize and destroy civic space."
[FN423]
  Moreover, as a result of increased privatization, ownership of information is likely to become concentrated in a few
transnational firms that possess a lot of market power but not necessarily creative or innovative skills.  This
concentration will inevitably lead to some commercial censorship.  Commercial influence over the availability of
information impacts us all.  We already live in a culture in which it is very difficult to be genuinely different.  Any
differentiation allowed in a commercial culture is actually the illusion of difference as captured by the market.
  The public sphere "is not an arena of market relations but rather one of discursive relations, a theater for debating
and deliberating rather than for buying and selling." [FN424] As such, the public sphere should be kept conceptually
distinct from the economy. [FN425]
  Legal rules that treat creative expression as more than simply a commodity are a cogent statement of the
importance of creative expression for individual autonomy and community.  Such rules reflect and catalyze a
rhetoric that recognizes the centrality of discourse for self-realization and collective identity. [FN426]
  The digital environment should exist as a "shared domain of citizens, of spectators, of artists, of cultural creators,"
[FN427] in other words, a civil society distinct from the market.  "[T]hose who see community as a medium for
deliberation argue for government intervention to preserve the Internet as a space for public access and for debate
about issues of public interest." [FN428]
  *716 In a public world reduced to the private marketplace, it is not only politics that vanishes but the very concept
of a public and thus of public goods, public will, and public interest.  Culture and art are public goods: without
public space and a community to inhabit it, they too disappear, transmogrified into private commodities. [FN429]
  Furthermore, "the ownership and control of information is one of the most important forms of power in
contemporary society." [FN430]  Copyright laws restrict the social flow of texts, photographs, music, and most other
symbolic works.  All of these forms retain their cultural qualities, however, and in a world where mass media tends
to monopolize the dissemination of signifying forms, the cultural resources constituting our community are
increasingly the properties of others.  Thus, copyright will provide "the key to the distribution of wealth, power, and
access in the information society.  The intellectual property regime could make or break the educational, political,
scientific, and cultural promise" of cyberspace. [FN431]  "Like most property regimes, our intellectual property
regime will be contentious in distributional, ideological and efficiency terms.  It will have effects on market power,
economic concentration and social structure." [FN432]  "It is the locus of the most important decisions in
information policy.  It profoundly affects the distribution of political and economic power in the digital
environment." [FN433]  Despite its importance, however, there has been little protection for the public with respect
to the information society.  A public trust paradigm would require such protection.
B. Application of the Paradigm
  Pursuant to a public trust theory, information is inherently public property that "inheres in the first instance in an
individual's freedom to use the knowledge of others rather than an individual's freedom to exclude others from the
use of knowledge." [FN434]  This "knowledge should be kept in a trust that is publicly accessible" and guarded
against over-appropriation *717 through unwarranted privatization. [FN435]  The public trust doctrine reposits in
the government a responsibility to manage public resources for the long-term public interest. [FN436]  This theory
would require that information policy "be managed with extreme care by Congress and the courts." Thus, Congress
and the courts would be required to administer information policy in a way that both "preserves and nurtures a
commons of knowledge." Thus, application of public trust principles would require Congress and the courts to
promote the public interest through an access paradigm rather than a market paradigm.
1. An affirmative duty for Congress
  As Jessica Litman has noted, the current structure of copyright legislation is improper in that it involves "an
egregious delegation of legislative authority to the very interests the statute purports to regulate." [FN437] Instead of
doing its job, [FN438] "Congress seems to lack the interest, expertise, and institutional memory to represent the
public on this particular project; indeed, what Congress has done more often than not is delegate the job of coming
up with legislation to interested private parties." [FN439]
  The public needs some theory of representation in the process of constructing copyright policy. [FN440]  Thus, we
need a mechanism for exerting the influence of the public interest on the drafting process to ensure that copyright
legislation does not unduly burden public access to copyrighted works.  "What it would require, though, is a
different sort of legislative proposal than the ones we have gotten used to seeing over the years." [FN441]  One that
would stress the "public's interest in the 'free flow of ideas, information, and commerce."' [FN442] Pursuant to
public trust theory, Congress would be required to legislate in the public interest.  The structure *718 and
interpretation of the Copyright Clause provides a mechanism for this duty.
  Congress finds its authority to fashion the copyright laws in the copyright clause of Article I, section 8 of the
Constitution.  This constitutional Enabling Clause contains various words of limitation. [FN443]  For example, the
phrase "limited times" prevents Congress from enacting a copyright statute that would grant indefinite protection for
copyrighted works. [FN444] Furthermore, the Court views the words "Authors" and "Writings" as words of
limitation that require a work to embody some threshold amount of creativity before copyright protection can be
granted. [FN445]  As the Court emphasized in Feist Publications v. Rural Telephone Service Co.: "Originality is a
constitutional requirement." [FN446]  Although the Court rarely finds that grants of power imply strong substantive
limits on congressional exercise of the power granted, its statement in Feist indicates that the Court may find that the
copyright and patent clause provides a stronger definitional limitation on Congress's powers to privatize
information.
  Similarly, the Introductory Clause, "promote the Progress of Science," can be interpreted as words of limitation on
Congress's authority to privatize information. [FN447]  This limitation could include the requirement that copyright
policy begin from the baseline of public access.  As the Sony Court stated: "As the text of the Constitution makes
plain, it is Congress that has been assigned the task of defining the scope of the limited monopoly that should be
granted to authors or to inventors in order to give the public appropriate access to their work product." [FN448]
Thus, Congress would bear the responsibility of allocating access to such resources consistently with the public
trust.
2. An Affirmative Duty for the Courts
  A public trust paradigm would additionally require the courts to resolve any ambiguities that might arise when
legislation is applied in the context of new technology using public access as the baseline. [FN449]  When
interpreting various copyright doctrines, the *719 courts should have an implicit obligation to consider the public's
non-market values. [FN450]  For example, the 1976 Copyright Act's three general limiting principles are the fair use
doctrine, the distinction between idea and expression, and the first sale doctrine.  The courts should resolve
questions stemming from new technology with particular attention to their functional significance to an access
paradigm.  Such a paradigm would require courts to interpret the statute's few limiting principles expansively in
order to preserve the balance between rights and access that copyright policy theoretically seeks to achieve.
Conclusion
  The advent of digital technology promises to change the way society is shaped.  Thus, those shaping the legal
policies surrounding this technology must consider the effects of such policies on the public.  However, recent
trends in copyright policy as applied to the digital environment have resulted in a trend toward an unwarranted
privatization of cyberspace and the information that flows through it.  Instead, policy should be shaped from public
rights baseline: The notion that information is inherently public property and, as such, its management through
copyright policy is subject to the same public trust principles that have operated as a check on the government's
management of other types of public resources.
  As the federal government pauses to reconsider and evaluate the future of copyright in the context of the
information society, it is important to realize that the recognition of these proprietary rights is consistent with public
trust resources generally.  Moreover, the public trust doctrine, by providing for the concurrent existence of public
and private interests in common resources, *720 should to a large extent dispel the condemnation of users' rights as
an unqualified give-away of private property or, conversely, a condemnation of copyright as an unqualified give-
away of public resources.
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[FN82]. See Litman, Right to Read, supra note 60, at 30.
[FN83]. Copyright's expansion into a broad proprietary right began with the extension of protection to derivative
works based on original expression.  In the nineteenth century, an author's legally protected copyright interest
consisted only of the exclusive right to make copies of her work in its original form. See Lunney, supra note 6, at
534.  Thus, a secondary use of an author's expression would interfere with the author's copyright interest only if that
use would directly compete with the author's original work in its original form. See id. at 534, 542; Netanel, supra
note 20, at 301-02.
  The 1976 Copyright Act extended an author's rights beyond competitive displacement of the demand for the
author's original work by prohibiting most unauthorized derivative uses of a copyrighted work.  Derivative works
are defined broadly to include "a translation, musical arrangement, dramatization, fictionalization, motion picture
version, sound recording, art reproduction, abridgment, condensation, or any other form in which a work may be
recast, transformed, or adapted."  17 U.S.C. ß  101 (1994); see also 17 U.S.C. ß ß  106(2), (4), (5) (Supp. 1996).
Most of these derivative uses will not displace the demand for the original work in its original form, and thus are not
the type of competitive uses copyright protection was previously limited to.  Lunney, supra note 6, at 628-29.  Note
that the user will have already paid the market price to obtain a copy of the work and thus these rights require an
additional licensing fee over and above the market price for a copy.  Thus, the exclusive right to prepare derivative
works based upon the copyrighted work extends the author's monopoly over not only the work in its original form,
but also over noncompeting works as well.  See id. at 542-46.  For example, the creator of a cartoon is afforded the
exclusive right to create toys or other objects based on the cartoon's characters.  The author of a book has the
exclusive right to prepare a movie version of the book.
  Because copyright now protects derivative works that do not displace the demand for the original, the courts are
beginning to hold that unauthorized uses can amount to infringement based on lost potential licensing revenue. See,
e.g., Am. Geophysical Union v. Texaco, Inc., 60 F.3d 913 (2d Cir. 1994); Princeton University Press v. Mich.
Document Servs., Inc., 99 F.3d 1381 (6th Cir. 1996).  Pursuant to this interpretation, the Copyright Act now enables
the author to control every valuable use of her work.  See Lunney, supra note 6, at 545-46; see also Paul Goldstein,
Copyright and Legislation, 55 Law & Contemp. Probs. 77, 85 (1992) ("Congress has given copyright owners rights
to every market in which consumers derive value from their works....").  Under an incentive rationale, affording
such rights to authors is justified only when the return on derivative works is necessary at the outset to provide
incentives for the author to create the original work. See Sterk, supra note 6, at 1215.  This would be true only in
those limited cases where: "(1) the projected returns from the original work are too small to justify the costs of
production, and (2) the projected returns from the derivative work are so large relative to the cost of producing the
derivative work that the difference will more than make up the projected deficit on the original work alone."  Id. at
1215-16.  Extending derivative rights beyond such limited cases expands copyright protection beyond the reach of
the incentive rationale and into the domain of neoclassical economic justification.  The White Paper sought to
extend this trend to the digital environment by equating the incidental storage of electronic transmissions to
potentially actionable reproductions.
[FN84]. See White Paper, supra note 73, at 64-66.
[FN85]. See Netanel, Global Arena, supra note 57, at 314-15.
[FN86]. See generally White Paper, supra note 73, at 64-66.
[FN87]. See id. at 65 n.202.
[FN88]. See Stephen Fraser, The Conflict Between the First Amendment and Copyright Law and its Impact on the
Internet, 16 Cardozo Arts & Ent. L.J. 1, 42 (1998).
[FN89]. See id. at 43.
[FN90]. See, e.g., MAI Sys. Corp. v. Peak Computer, Inc., 991 F.2d 511, 519 (9th Cir. 1993)  (holding that copyright
infringement occurred where computer serviceperson transferred a computer program from a software disk to a
computer's random access memory in order to check the operating system's "error log"); Vault Corp. v. Quaid
Software, Ltd., 847 F.2d 255, 260 (5th Cir. 1988) (stating that "the act of loading a program from a medium of
storage into a computer's memory creates a copy of the program"); Telerate Sys., Inc. v. Caro, 689 F. Supp. 221, 231
(S.D.N.Y. 1988) (discussing unauthorized remote access to database; receipt of data in unauthorized user's computer
held to create a copy).
[FN91]. See Anawalt, supra note 55, at 396 ("A shift to ownership of transmission rights would present a major shift
in the concept of the substance of rights that our law intends to grant to authors.").
[FN92]. See id. at 395.  The legislative history of the Copyright Act of 1976 states: "'[F]ixation' would exclude from
the concept purely evanescent or transient reproductions such as those projected briefly on a screen, shown
electronically on a television or other cathode ray tube, or captured momentarily in the 'memory' of a computer."
H.R. Rep. No. 94-1476, at 53 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5667.
[FN93]. See Michael F. Morano, Note, Legislating in the Face of New Technology: Copyright Laws for the Digital
Age, 20 Fordham Int'l L.J. 1374, 1419 (1997).
[FN94]. See Anawalt, supra note 55, at 395.
[FN95]. See Jane C. Ginsburg, Authors and Users in Copyright, 45 J. Copyright Soc'y U.S.A. 1, 4 (1997).
[FN96]. Litman, Right to Read, supra note 60, at 31-32.
[FN97]. Jessica Litman, Revising Copyright Law for the Information Age, 75 Or. L. Rev. 19, 37 (1996) [hereinafter
Litman, Revising Copyright].
[FN98]. See Johnson & Post, supra note 25, at 1385.
[FN99]. Litman, Revising Copyright, supra note 97, at 24.
[FN100]. See Anawalt, supra note 55, at 397.
[FN101]. Uploading is the process by which a user takes files from her computer and transfers them to another
computer system for access by other subscribers. Baran, supra note 80, at 18.
[FN102]. Users may download programs and files from the online services.   Id.  Downloading is the process of
obtaining information from another computer and transferring it to one's own computer.  Id.
[FN103]. See 17 U.S.C. ß  109 (1994); Johnson & Post, supra note 25, at 1386 ("Application of the 'first sale'
doctrine (allowing the purchaser of a copyrighted work to freely resell the copy she purchased) is problematic when
the transfer of a lawfully owned copy technically involves the making of a new copy before the old one is
eliminated....").
[FN104]. Jessica Litman, Reforming Information Law in Copyright's Image, 22 U. Dayton L. Rev 587, 603 (1997)
[hereinafter Litman, Copyright's Image].
[FN105]. Id. at 605.
[FN106]. See Boyle, supra note 77, at 101.  According to Boyle: "H.R. 2441, 104th Cong. (1995) and S. 1284, 104th
Cong. (1995), eventually stalled because of intense resistance from a variety of groups, including internet service
providers, computer companies which embrace 'open systems,' teachers, scientists, and civil libertarians."  Id. at 101
n.39.
[FN107]. See id. at 101.
[FN108]. See Neil Netanel, Recent Developments in Copyright Law, 7 Tex. Intell. Prop. L.J. 331, 332 (1999).
[FN109]. See The Law of Cyberspace, supra note 56, at 1650-51.
[FN110]. Id.
[FN111]. Id. at 1651.
[FN112]. See id. at 1652.
[FN113]. See id. at 1652-53.
[FN114]. See id.
[FN115]. Id.
[FN116]. See 17 U.S.C. ß  109 (1994).
[FN117]. See The Law of Cyberspace, supra note 56, at 1653.
[FN118]. See 17 U.S.C. ß  107 (1994).
[FN119]. See The Law of Cyberspace, supra note 56, at 1653.
[FN120]. See id.
[FN121]. See 17 U.S.C. ß  301 (1994).
[FN122]. See U.S. Const. art. I, ß  8, cl. 8, as interpreted by the Court in Feist Publ'ns Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co.,
499 U.S. 340 (1991).
[FN123]. Litman, Information Policy, supra note 69, at 187.
[FN124]. In addition, on-line accessibility to information is increasingly likely to be subject to contractual licenses
which may bar various uses such as down-loading and reselling material.  Kreiss, supra note 14, at 46 n.161.  To the
extent, however, that the material is factual or that barred uses are "fair," the licensing restrictions would go beyond
those offered by copyright law.  Id.  Such license restrictions may be preempted by ß  301 or ß  107, respectively, of
the Copyright Act.
[FN125]. The Law of Cyberspace, supra note 56, at 1652 ("[Access control] gives copyright owners the power to
prevent any unauthorized use and not just uses that are protected under copyright law.") (citing Elkin-Koren, supra
note 60, at 290); Litman, Right to Read, supra note 60, at 40 ("United States copyright law has always given
copyright owners some form of exclusive reproduction right.  It has never before now given them an exclusive
reading right, and it is hard to make a plausible argument that Congress would have enacted a law giving copyright
owners control of reading.") (footnote omitted).
[FN126]. See The Law of Cyberspace, supra note 56, at 1650.
[FN127]. See id. at 1651-52 & n.101.
[FN128]. See, e.g., Julie E. Cohen, Copyright and the Jurisprudence of Self-Help, 13 Berkeley Tech. L.J. 1089, 1141
(1998) ("If the user privileges established by copyright... are to mean anything, users must be afforded affirmative
rights to protect themselves.  A 'right of fair breach' is meaningless unless it includes a right to effectuate the breach-
-a right to hack the digital code that implements and enforces the challenged restriction."); Pamela Samuelson, The
U.S. Digital Agenda at WIPO, 37 Va. J. Int'l L. 369, 410 (1997) (criticizing "the perceived need for law to regulate
infringement-enabling technologies").
[FN129]. Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA), Pub. L. No. 105-304,  112 Stat. 2860 (1998) (codified to
amend scattered sections of 17 U.S.C. & 28 U.S.C. and codified at 17 U.S.C. ß ß  512, 1201-05, 1301- 32 & 28
U.S.C. ß  4001 (Supp. IV 1998)).
[FN130]. See 17 U.S.C. ß  1201(a)(1)(a) ("No person shall circumvent a technological measure that effectively
controls access to a work protected under this title.").
[FN131]. A number of major multilateral copyright treaties exist to harmonize intellectual property law.  These
treaties include the Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property (TRIPs) annex to 1994 World Trade Organization
treaty; The Berne Convention on the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works (incorporated in TRIPs accord,
except for art. 6bis, moral rights); WIPO Copyright Treaty; WIPO Performers and Phonograms Treaty (WPPT); and
the Universal Copyright Convention (UCC).
[FN132]. WIPO is a specialized agency of the United Nations that  "administers intellectual property treaties, serves
as a forum for treaty drafting, conclusion, and revision, and provides technical assistance for the drafting of
domestic intellectual property legislation."  See Netanel, Global Arena, supra note 57, at 218 n.3.
[FN133]. See Boyle, supra note 77, at 101.  Between December 2 and 20, 1996, 160 nations gathered in Geneva,
Switzerland to discuss copyright protection in an environment where protected works may be digitized and
distributed over worldwide computer networks.  As a result of the conference, two treaties were developed with
general provisions encompassing the distribution of works over the Internet--the WIPO Copyright Treaty and the
WIPO Performances and Phonograms Treaty.  See Netanel, Global Arena, supra note 57, at 219 n.4.These treaties
represent the most critical changes seen in copyright law in the last 25 years.
[FN134]. See Netanel, Global Arena, supra note 57, at 221 n.12
[FN135]. Id. at 218 n.3.
[FN136]. See Boyle, supra note 77, at 102.
[FN137]. Netanel, Global Arena, supra note 57, at 218-19.
[FN138]. See H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 105-796, at 63 (1998), reprinted in 1998 U.S.C.C.A.N. 645, 646.  "[T]he
principal substantive provisions of this Title go beyond what is required by those treaties and take effect regardless
of whether these treaties ever enter into force in the United States."  Netanel, Recent Developments, supra note 108,
at 332; see DMCA Pub. L. No. 105-304, ß  105, 112 Stat. 2860, 2877 (1998) (indicating which provisions are to
take effect immediately upon enactment and which are to take effect upon the entry into force of the WIPO
Copyright Treaty).
[FN139]. See Senator Orrin G. Hatch, Essay, Toward a Principled Approach to Copyright Legislation at the Turn of
the Millennium, 59 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 719, 751 (1998).
[FN140]. See DMCA ß  103, 112 Stat. at 2863-72 (adding ch. 12, ß ß  1201- 05, to 17 U.S.C.).  Section
1201(a)(3)(A) defines "to circumvent a technological measure" as "to descramble a scrambled work, to decrypt an
encrypted work, or otherwise to avoid, bypass, remove, deactivate, or impair a technological measure, without the
authority of the copyright owner."  Id.
[FN141]. Litman, Revising Copyright, supra note 97, at 37.
[FN142]. See U.S. Const. art. I, ß  8, cl. 8.
[FN143]. See Heather J. Meeker, The Ineluctable Modality of the Visible: Fair Use and Fine Arts in the Post-
Modern Era, 10 U. Miami Ent. & Sports L. Rev. 195, 201-02 (1993).
[FN144]. Id. at 202.
[FN145]. See Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act, Pub. L. No. 105- 298, ß  102, 112 Stat. 2827 (1998)
(codified in scattered sections of 17 U.S.C.).
[FN146]. See id. ß  102(b), 112 Stat. at 2827 (codified to amend 17 U.S.C. ß  302 (1994)).
[FN147]. See id.
[FN148]. See Hatch, supra note 139, at 728.
[FN149]. Id.
[FN150]. Id. at 729.
[FN151]. Id. at 728.
[FN152]. Id. at 734.
[FN153]. See Sterk, supra note 6, at 1205-06; Meeropol v. Nizer, 560 F.2d 1061, 1068 (2d Cir. 1977) ("The doctrine
offers a means of balancing the exclusive right of a copyright holder with the public's interest in dissemination of
information affecting areas of universal concern, such as art, science, history, or industry.").
[FN154]. The fair use doctrine is codified at 17 U.S.C. ß  107 (1994).  The full text of the provision reads as follows:
  Notwithstanding the provisions of sections 106 and 106A, the fair use of a copyrighted work, including such use by
reproduction in copies or phonorecords or by any other means specified by that section, for purposes such as
criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching (including multiple copies for classroom use), scholarship, or research,
is not an infringement of copyright.  In determining whether the use made of a work in any particular case is a fair
use the factors to be considered shall include--(1) the purpose and character of the use, including whether such use is
of a commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes; (2) the nature of the copyrighted work; (3) the
amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the copyrighted work as a whole; and (4) the effect of the
use upon the potential market for or value of the copyrighted work.  The fact that a work is unpublished shall not
itself bar a finding of fair use if such finding is made upon consideration of all the above factors.
[FN155]. Id.
  See Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 577 (1994) (holding the fair use doctrine "permits courts to
avoid rigid application of the copyright statute when, on occasion, it would stifle the very creativity which that law
is designed to foster.").
[FN156]. See Meeker, supra note 143.
[FN157]. See Lunney, supra note 6, at 533-34; see, e.g., Am. Geophysical Union v. Texaco, Inc., 60 F.3d 913, 922
(2d Cir. 1994) (stating that any copying of another's work that allows one to earn a profit weighs against a finding of
fair use); Twin Peaks Prods., Inc. v. Publications Intl., Ltd., 996 F.2d 1366, 1371-73 (2d Cir. 1993) (finding that a
book about a television series infringed the copyrights in the audio-visual works that constituted the television
series); Rogers v. Koons, 960 F.2d 301, 310 (2d Cir. 1992) (making a fine art statue using a cheap, kitschy postcard
as a model constituted infringement); Horgan v. MacMillan, Inc., 789 F.2d 157, 162-63 (2d Cir. 1986) (suggesting
that a book about ballet could infringe a copyright in the ballet's choreography); Basic Books, Inc. v. Kinko's
Graphics Corp., 758 F. Supp. 1522, 1535 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) (finding infringement where the defendant was making a
profit repackaging the plaintiff's copyrighted works).
[FN158]. See Netanel, supra note 20, at 290; see also Lunney, supra note 6, at 552:
  By defining the fair use doctrine as a means to address compelling needs for access, otherwise unaddressed, that
may arise in particular cases, the Court has converted the fair use doctrine from the primary standard by which
courts are to resolve the issue of infringement into a secondary standard to be applied only in exceptional cases.
[FN159]. See Robert P. Merges, Are You Making Fun of Me?: Notes on Market Failure and the Parody Defense in
Copyright, 21 AIPLA Q.J. 305 (1993).
[FN160]. Judge Pierre Leval, a noted copyright jurist and scholar, contends that the court unnecessarily focused on a
relationship between commercial objectives and fair use to justify finding fair use in the case of home videotaping.
See Pierre N. Leval, Nimmer Lecture: Fair Use Rescued, 44 UCLA L. Rev. 1449, 1455-56 (1997) [hereinafter
Leval, Nimmer Lecture].
[FN161]. 464 U.S. 417 (1984).
[FN162]. Id. at 451.
[FN163]. Id. at 450.
[FN164]. Judge Leval stated:
  Most undertakings in which we expect to find well-justified instances of fair use are commercial.  These include, of
course, journalism, commentary, criticism, parody, biography, and history; even the publication of scholarly analysis
is often commercial.  If all of these are presumptively unfair, then fair use is to be found only in sermons and
classroom lectures.  This would not be a very useful doctrine.
[FN165]. Leval, Nimmer Lecture, supra note 160, at 1456.
  471 U.S. 539 (1985).
[FN166]. Professor Gordon presented this neoclassicist approach to fair use analysis in Wendy J. Gordon, Fair Use
as Market Failure: A Structural and Economic Analysis of the Betamax Case and its Predecessors, 82 Colum. L.
Rev. 1600, 1605 (1982) (discussing fair use where transactions costs or other impediments interfere with free market
transactions between copyright owners and users) [hereinafter Gordon, Fair Use as Market Failure].
[FN167]. The Court explained that copyright serves "to motivate the creative activity of authors... by the provision
of a special reward." 471 U.S. at 546 (quoting Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 429
(1984)).
[FN168]. Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 566.
[FN169]. See id. at 549-50.
[FN170]. 495 U.S. 207 (1990).
[FN171]. Id. at 238.
[FN172]. Id.
[FN173]. 510 U.S. 569 (1994).
[FN174]. In Campbell, the Court announced that commercial use should not be determinative because "[i]f, indeed,
commerciality carried presumptive force against a finding of fairness, the presumption would swallow nearly all of
the illustrative uses listed in the preamble paragraph of ß  107, including news reporting, comment, criticism,
teaching, scholarship, and research, since these activities 'are generally conducted for profit in this country."'
Campbell, 510 U.S. at 584 (quoting Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 592 (Brennan, J., dissenting)) (holding no single
factor should be treated as dispositive in the fair use analysis).  The Court also conspicuously failed to refer to harm
to potential market as the supreme consideration in fair use cases.
[FN175]. Campbell, 510 U.S. at 592.
[FN176]. Id.
[FN177]. Id. at 590-94.
[FN178]. Committee reports described fair use as an "equitable rule of reason."  See H.R. Rep. No. 94-1476, at 65
(1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5678.  The Sony court called fair use an equitable rule of reason that
required "a sensitive balancing of interests."  Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 455
(1984).
[FN179]. See McJohn, supra note 67, at 64.
  In this view, permitting fair use of a copyrighted work is, to the extent of that use, tantamount to holding the work
in common, leading to inefficient overuse of the resource and blocking pricing signals.  Accordingly, fair use should
be limited to situations where transaction costs impede licensing transactions.
[FN180]. Id.
  See id. at 62; Wendy J. Gordon & Sam Postbrief, On Commodifying Intangibles, 10 Yale J.L. & Human. 135, 157
(1998) (book review) ("From an economic perspective, one of the primary reasons for not propertizing everything
has been the presence of significant transaction costs.").  Both the Texaco court and the Princeton University Press
court based decisions of infringement on a decrease in transaction costs (brought about by the availability of
apparently practical photocopy licensing) by decreasing the scope of fair use.  See Gordon & Postbrief, supra, at
156-57; Am. Geophysical Union v. Texaco, Inc., 60 F.3d 913 (2d Cir. 1994).  For commentators applying several
variations of the transaction cost approach to fair use, see 2 Paul Goldstein, Copyright ch. 10 (2d ed. 1996); Gordon,
Fair Use as Market Failure, supra note 166; Trotter Hardy, Property (and Copyright) in Cyberspace, 1996 U. Chi.
Legal F. 217 (1996); Landes & Posner, supra note 23, at 357-61 (economic analysis employing the transaction cost
approach to fair use).
[FN181]. The Law of Cyberspace, supra note 56, at 1654.
[FN182]. See Gordon & Postbrief,  supra note 180, at 139-40; McJohn, supra note 67, at 63.  Jane Ginsburg has
argued:
  With respect to online access, the transaction costs justification should no longer apply, since individual billing and
tracking are fully possible, and indeed have long been in place in private networks, such as LEXIS and Westlaw.
Moreover, it is not clear that any private copying justification applies to unauthorized access to a work of
authorship....
Ginsburg, supra note 96, at 12.
[FN183]. See Gordon & Postbrief, supra note 180, at 157; McJohn, supra note 67, at 64.  Computerization also
provides the ability to wall off information by a variety of means.  For example, producers can deny access to
certain users (databases and search engines).  Boyle, supra note 77, at 104.
[FN184]. See White Paper, supra note 73, at 82 (predicting that "[i]t may be that technological means of tracking
transactions and licensing will lead to reduced application and scope of the fair use doctrine").
[FN185]. See id. at 73, 82.
[FN186]. See DMCA, Pub. L. No. 105-304, ß  103, 112 Stat. 2860  (1998) (codified in part at 17 U.S.C. ß
1201(a)(l) (Supp. IV 1998)).
[FN187]. See, e.g. H.R. Comm. Rep. No. 105-551 pt. 2, at 25-26 (1998).
[FN188]. See DMCA ß  103, 112 Stat. at 2864 (codified in part at 17 U.S.C. ß  1201(a)(1)(A) (Supp. IV 1998)).
[FN189]. See id. (codified in part at 17 U.S.C. ß  1201(a)(1)(C) (Supp. IV 1998)).  In making this determination, the
Librarian must devote particular attention to the availability of works for nonprofit archival, preservation, and
educational purposes and for criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching, scholarship, and research.  Id.
[FN190]. See id.
[FN191]. See id. (codified in part at 17 U.S.C. ß  1201(a)(1)(D) (Supp. IV 1998)).
[FN192]. See id. (codified in part at 17 U.S.C. ß  1201(a)-(b) (Supp. IV 1998)).
[FN193]. Netanel, Recent Developments, supra note 108, at 333-34.
[FN194]. See William Patry, The Enumerated Powers Doctrine and Intellectual Property: An Imminent
Constitutional Collision, 67 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 359, 366 (1999) (citing Feist Publ'ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co.,
499 U.S. 340, 350 (1991)).
[FN195]. Id. (citing Feist, 499 U.S. at 350).
[FN196]. See Keith Aoki, Neocolonialism, Anticommons Property, and Biopiracy in the (Not-So-Brave) New
World Order of International Intellectual Property Protection, 6 Ind. J. of Global Legal Stud. 11, 22-23 (1998)
[hereinafter Aoki, Neocolonialism].
[FN197]. See id. at 23-24.
[FN198]. See H.R. 2652, 105th Cong. ß  1202 (1997).  The bill was the subject of hearings on October 23, 1997, and
February 12, 1998.  See Collections of Information Antipiracy Act: Hearings on H.R. 2652 Before the Subcomm. on
Courts and Intellectual Property of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 105th Cong. (1998).  The House Committee
on the Judiciary reported it on May 12, 1998, see H.R. Rep. No. 105-525 (1998), and the House passed it on March
19, 1998, see 144 Cong. Rec. H3398 (daily ed. Mar. 19, 1998).  The legislation was passed again with minor
differences on August 4, 1998, as title V of the DMCA, H.R. 2281, 105th Cong. (1998), also known as the
"Christmas tree" bill, H.R. 2281. The Conference Committee deleted the database provision, however, killing the
initiative for the 105th Congress.  See H.R. Rep. No. 105-796 (1998), reprinted in 1998 U.S.C.C.A.N. 639.
[FN199]. Feist, 499 U.S. at 350.
[FN200]. Patry, supra note 194, at 360.
[FN201]. Litman, Information Policy, supra note 69, at 205.
[FN202]. This model law was initially introduced as part of a proposed revision to the Uniform Commercial Code.
See U.C.C. Art. 2B-Licenses ß  2B-111 (draft of August 1, 1998), National Conference of Commissioners on
Uniform State Laws, Drafts of Uniform and Model Acts at http:// www.law.upenn.edu/library/bll/ulc/ulc_frame.htm.
The National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws and the American Law Institute eventually
decided not to promulgate legal rules for computer transactions as Article 2B of the Uniform Commercial Code after
the proposed legislation came under attack from consumer, writer, artist, and academic groups.  The conference
instead promulgated the proposed rules for adoption by states as the Uniform Computer Information Transactions
Act.
[FN203]. See Pamela Samuelson, Intellectual Property and Contract Law for the Information Age: The Impact of
Article 2B of the Uniform Commercial Code on the Future of Information and Commerce, 87 Cal. L. Rev. 1, 4-5
(1999).
[FN204]. See id.; see also Garry L. Founds, Shrinkwrap and Clickwrap Agreements: 2B or Not 2B?, 52 Fed. Comm.
L.J. 99, 101 (1999).
[FN205]. See Thomas A. Lapinski, The Developing Legal Infrastructure and the Globalization of Information:
Constructing a Framework for Critical Choices in the New Millennium Internet--Character, Content and Confusion,
6 Rich. J.L. & Tech. 19, 52-53 (2000).
[FN206]. Gordon & Postbrief, supra note 180, at 143.
[FN207]. Id.
[FN208]. Rose, The Several Futures of Property, supra note 74, at 147-48.
[FN209]. Gordon & Postbrief, supra note 180, at 138.
[FN210]. Boyle, supra note 77, at 95.
[FN211]. Aoki, Cultural Geography, supra note 54, at 1310.
[FN212]. Rose, The Several Futures of Property, supra note 74, at 145; see also Aoki, Cultural Geography, supra
note 54, at 1310-11.
[FN213]. Alfred C. Yen, Restoring the Natural Law: Copyright as Labor and Possession, 51 Ohio St. L.J. 517, 546
(1990).
[FN214]. See McJohn, supra note 67, at 66; see also Goldstein, supra note 180, at 229 (arguing for "extending
copyright into every corner of economic value"); Hardy, supra note 180, at 217 (arguing that copyright should be
employed to privatize intellectual property as much as possible).
[FN215]. Litman, Information Policy, supra note 69, at 206.
[FN216]. Id.
[FN217]. See id.
[FN218]. Information Infrastructure Task Force, Intellectual Property and the National Information Infrastructure: A
Preliminary Draft of the Report of the Working Group on Intellectual Property Rights (July 1994), at 44-45 & n.130.
[FN219]. See Litman, Information Policy, supra note 69.
[FN220]. Litman, Right to Read, supra note 60, at 36.
[FN221]. See Boyle, supra note 77, at 105.
  Some participants have suggested that the United States is being divided into a nation of information "haves" and
"have nots" and that this could be ameliorated by ensuring that the fair use defense is broadly generous in the
[National Information Infrastructure] context.  The Working Group rejects the notion that copyright owners should
be taxed--apart from all others--to facilitate the legitimate goal of "universal access."
Id. (citing White Paper, supra note 73 at 15-17)).
[FN222]. Hatch, supra note 139, at 723.
[FN223]. Princeton Univ. Press v. Mich. Document Servs., Inc., 99 F.3d 1381, 1390 (6th Cir. 1996) (quoting Am.
Geophysical Union v. Texaco, Inc. 60 F.3d at 913, 918 (1994)).
[FN224]. See Gordon & Postbrief, supra note 180, at 145.
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